College Admission System Reforms: The Road to Stability
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| Title | College Admission System Reforms: The Road to Stability
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| Author | Li Xiaolonga Tan Jingb and Xu Shengyan |
| Organization | School Of Economics, Fudan University; College Enterprise Of Management, Hohai University |
| Email | lxl@fudan.edu.cn,tanjing@fudan.edu.cn,xushenygan_yn@126.com |
| Key Words | Match; Stability; Quota; Competition; Offsite College Entrance Examination |
| Abstract | The existing quota system of College Entrance Examination creates the candidate-university match where some candidates with good scores accepted to some poor university while some candidates with poor scores accepted to some good university. Competition system oriented reforms can achieve stability of the college admission results, but will hurt massively vested interests under the current system, triggering the wave of protests. Therefore desirable college admission system should be a compromise between quota system and competition system. Population proportion quota, funded proportion quota, subprime quota, and Offsite College Entrance Examination quota are four typical compromise systems. The numerical simulations based on the data from Beijing and Shandong show that subprime quota system is the most desirable among all six systems mentioned above, in terms of both deviation degree from the stable matching (deviation rate) and intensity of protests caused by damaged vested interests (damage rate). In addition, the current strong appeal to Offsite College Entrance Examination is not the most desirable option because of both its deviation rate and its damage rate larger than competition system. |
| Serial Number | WP568 |
| Time | 2014-01-14 |
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