| Abstract | The private benefits of control, as the compensation for the cost of control, are actually realized by the increment of value from the effect of control on the performance improvement of corporate governance. The higher cost of control from the state shareholders requires higher benefits due to its control on the corporate governance, so as to compensate for its cost of control. However, this increment from the effect of control of the state ownership didn’t happen, and then comes the mismatch of the private benefits of control with the private cost of control, i.e., the compensation cannot work through the value increments. In that case, the method and approach of the compensation for the private cost of control of the large state shareholders have changed, from the very beginning, to the approach of excessive benefits of control in a large scale. In addition, it is demonstrated in the form of the expropriation of large shareholders on the small shareholders. Meanwhile, the motivation of private benefits of the large state shareholders can also drive them to expropriate higher excessive benefits of control. Hence, the expropriation of state large shareholders will be augmented. |