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股权激励对企业创新的影响研究:基于高管收益权衡视角
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TitleThe Effect of Equity Incentive on Innovation  
作者张倩倩 周铭山 董志勇  
AuthorZhang Qianqian,Zhou Mingshan and Dong Zhiyong  
作者单位西南财经大学会计学院;北京大学经济学院 
OrganizationSouthwestern University Of Finance And Economics;Peking University 
作者Emailzhangqq@swufe.edu.cn;zhoumingshan@swufe.edu.cn;dzy@pku.edu.cn 
中文关键词股权激励;企业创新;研发支出资本化;高管利益权衡 
Key WordsEquity Incentive; Innovation; Capitalization of R&D Spending; Trade-off 
内容提要Manso(2011)认为要激励高管创新,必须实行长期激励机制,缓解高管短期业绩压力。股权激励计划是现阶段我国上市公司进行长期激励的一种主要方式,我国上市公司实行股权激励计划通常以短期业绩作为行权条件,这意味着高管创新决策面临着短期业绩压力和长期股价上涨的权衡。本文选取我国A股上市公司2007-2014年数据,研究发现,实行股权激励计划之后,企业创新投入和发明专利产出均有显著增加。结合高管的收益权衡需求,对其作用机制探讨发现,面对短期业绩压力,高管在进行创新投入过程中,倾向于通过虚增资本化研发支出构建短期业绩“稳定器”。实行股权激励计划之后,企业创新投入和资本化研发支出均显著增加,但创新投入的产出率却没有明显改善,资本化研发投入的发明专利产出率显著降低。进一步研究发现,分析师跟踪和基金持股等外部监督机制有助于减弱股权激励作用下高管虚增资本化研发支出行为。本文的研究为我国上市公司股东识别股权激励计划实施中的风险点以及制定更为有效的股权激励计划提供了经验证据。 
AbstractManso (2011) argues that to motivate executive innovation, long-term incentives must be introduced to ease short-term performance pressures. Listed companies in China implementing equity incentive plan are usually use short-term performance as a condition of exercise, which means that executives are faced with the trade-offs between short-term performance and long-term stock price rise. Can equity incentives help executives to tolerate short-term innovation failure? This study finds that with the implementation of equity incentive plan, enterprise innovation investment and patent output increase significantly. Executives tend to "inflate" capitalization of R&D expenditure to ease short-term performance pressure. With the capitalization of R&D expenditure increasing significantly, the output rate of capitalization of R&D investment is significantly reducing. Furthermore, external supervision such as analyst tracking and fund holdings help to reduce the inflation risk of capitalization of R&D spending after implementing equity incentives. This paper analyzes the mechanism of equity incentive to promote enterprise innovation from the perspective of accounting policy choice of R&D expenditure, which provides a new perspective to the research of equity incentive effectiveness. 
文章编号WP1423 
登载时间2019-10-16 
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