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股权和控制权配置:从对等到非对等的逻辑——基于央属混合所有制上市公司的实证研究
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TitleThe Logic of Equity and Control Allocation: from Equal to Unequal  
作者刘汉民 齐 宇 解晓晴  
AuthorLiu Hanmin,Qi Yu and Xie Xiaoqing  
作者单位暨南大学管理学院 
OrganizationJinan University 
作者Emaillhmsh@hotmail.com;qiyu1213@163.com 
中文关键词混合所有制 国企改革 公司治理 企业绩效 
Key WordsMixed Ownership; SOEs Reform; Corporate Governance; Firm Performance  
内容提要针对混合所有制企业改革中企业控制权安排的难题,利用我国央属具有混合所有制性质的上市公司数据,在控制行业分类的前提下,通过研究股权结构和董事会结构与企业绩效的关系,论证了股权和控制权非对等配置的逻辑合理性。研究发现,降低前五大股东中国有股占比有利于提高企业绩效,而过快提高非国有股占比不利于提高企业绩效;提高非国有董事占比有利于提高企业绩效,而过快降低国有董事占比不利于提高企业绩效;相比于股权结构,董事会结构对企业绩效的影响更大。在上述研究基础上,进一步探索了国有股占比和非国有股占比的最优区间,并提出了在不改变国有控股地位的前提下,通过让渡或分享企业控制权,解决混合所有制改革困局的设想和建议。 
AbstractAt present, China's ongoing mixed ownership reform has encountered some problems, mainly for the arrangement of corporate control: on the one hand, the state-owned shares on behalf of the super-shareholder status still occupy the control advantage, weaken the heterogeneous shareholders' ability to participate; On the other hand, "one vote for one share" voting rules led to corporate control arrangements subject to ownership arrangements, state-owned enterprises(SOEs)' mixed ownership reform is getting difficult to advance to a deep level. How to arrange corporate control then be able to both promote mixed ownership reform and improve performance? There are two kinds of ideas on prior studies about control rights arrangement. One is the research under the equal logic of equity and control allocation, arguing that the arrangement of control rights should be decided by equity structure, pursuing “one vote”. The other is the research under the unequal logic of equity and control allocation, arguing that the arrangement of control rights can be separated from equity structure and do not need to follow the rule of “one vote”. Most scholars' research is confined to the first idea, such as Grossman & Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990), Harris & Raviv (1989). Based on the enterprise’s practice of unequal allocation between equity and control, some scholars begin to revise, and thereafter, put forward the unequal allocation between equity and control, as discussed in Choi (2015). Then, for a company co-existed with state-owned shares and non-state-owned shares, how to arrange control? Pursue “one vote” then improve firm performance? To answer this question, sufficient empirical data is needed to verify what extent will the equity and control allocation affect firm performance. By collecting data of firm performance, equity structure and board structure in all listed companies under SASAC, State Council manually, and using 1 year lag of equity structure and board structure to overcome the endogenous issue raised by Demsetz & Lehn (1985) and Davidson & Rowe (2004), under the premise of controlling industry classification, this paper investigates the relationship between equity structure, board structure and firm performance. We found that: (a) reducing the proportion of the first five largest state-owned shares is conducive to improving firm performance, but improving the proportion of the first five largest non-state-owned shares too fast is not conducive to improving firm performance; (b) increasing the proportion of state-owned directors is conducive to improving firm performance, but reducing the proportion of state-owned directors too fast is not conducive to improving firm performance. And compared with equity structure, the board structure has a greater effect on firm performance. Based on the above, the paper explores the best range of the proportion of state-owned and non-state-owned shares, and proposes approaches and suggestions about the reform of mixed-ownership enterprise through transfer or sharing of control rights, under the premise of unchanging the controlling status of state-owned shares. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) handled the real attributes of shareholders and directors carefully by judging the actual controller of the firm; (2) considering that equity and control may have inconsistency effects, examined the relationship between equity structure, board structure and firm performance, tested the different effects of equity and control on firm performance, demonstrated the logical rationality of unequal allocation between equity and control; (3) explored the best range of the proportion of the top five state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders, provided a quantitative basis for mixed ownership reform of SOEs; (4) in view of the actual situation of SOEs, put forward some countermeasures and suggestions to promote mixed ownership reform.  
文章编号WP1340 
登载时间2019-03-05 
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