不对称信息下的财政分权结构理论分析
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| Title | A Theory of Fiscal Decentralization with Information Asymmetry
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| 作者 | 赵晓军王灿 刘维刚 崔小勇 |
| Author | Zhao Xiaojun,Wang Can,Liu Weigang and Cui Xiaoyong |
| 作者单位 | 北京大学经济学院；中国社会科学院财经战略研究院 |
| Organization | Peking University; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences，CASS |
| 作者Email | zhaoxiaojun@pku.edu.cm；wangcan718@pku.edu.cn；weigangliu@126.com；cuixiaoyong@pku.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 不对称信息 财政分权 最优财政政策 |
| Key Words | Asymmetric information; fiscal decentralization; Optimal fiscal policy |
| 内容提要 | 本文结合了新动态公共财政理论和财政分权理论，把Golosov et al.（2003）的框架拓展到两级政府，在动态经济下研究了中央和地方政府的最优财政政策。本文考虑了两个层次的不对称信息：一是经济个体的私人劳动能力，二是地方政府的公共支出偏好。研究结论显示，中央对地方政府最优转移支付为正，在地方不具备生产能力时中央和地方对经济个体都征收资本和劳动收入税，当地方具备生产能力时中央政府不对资本征税。最后，本文通过数值模拟验证了该结论，并进一步分析了经济个体劳动能力和最优财政政策的关系。 |
| Abstract | In this paper, we incorporate fiscal decentralization into the new dynamic public finance theory, extending the framework of Golosov et al. (2003) to two levels of government, in which the central and local governments optimal fiscal policies are studied under a dynamic economy. This paper considers two levels of information hiding, one is private information of agent and the other is private preference of local government public expenditure. The study concluded that, the optimal transfer from central government positive, the labor and capital are positive when the local government does not own production capacity, and the capital tax is zero when the local government owns the production capacity. Finally, numerical simulation verifies the conclusions, and demonstrates the relationship between the individual labor capacity and optimal economic fiscal policies. |
| 文章编号 | WP1337 |
| 登载时间 | 2019-02-27 |
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