我国经营者集中的反垄断救济与“行为化”偏好研究——兼论专利密集领域的救济执法困境
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| Title | An Econometric Analysis of the China’s Merger Remedy Decisions and Antitrust Regulatory Behavioral Relief Preference
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| 作者 | 白让让 |
| Author | Bai Rangrang |
| 作者单位 | 复旦大学管理学院 |
| Organization | School of Management, Fudan University |
| 作者Email | rrbai@fudan.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 兼并救济 经营者集中 行为救济 反垄断法 实证检验 |
| Key Words | Merger Remedies, Operator Concentration, Behavioral Remedies, Antitrust Law, Empirical Studies |
| 内容提要 | 防止经营者集中活动对市场竞争效率的潜在危害，是各国反垄断立法的主要目标，对这类行为的法律干预方式就是结构性和行为性救济。在回顾和总结2008年我国反垄断法实施以来经营者集中的立法理念、程序和典型事实的基础上，本文提出了关于执法者决定和行为化偏好的若干假说。利用手动汇总的一个包含86个兼并案件的数据库（2008年至2016年），本文对我国商务部反垄断局的兼并救济决定的Probit回归发现：商务部做出救济与否的决定与兼并案件关联市场的集中度、参与者市场份额、是否纵向兼并和股权收购的比例显著正相关；对执法者偏好行为救济的负二项回归则表明：一个兼并活动被施加行为性救济的力度则与所在行业的网络特性、参与者的市场占有率和股权收购比例有关联。这些发现证明，商务部的经营者集中救济行为基本上符合我国反垄断法设定的“单边效应”和“协调效应”原则。鉴于行为性救济主要发生在专利密集的高科技领域，本文还从代表性案例分析的角度揭示了商务部偏好直接干预兼并后企业经营行为的主要因素，并指出行为干预往往与我国政府的产业管制体制发生冲突，加之它自身存在的执法困难，必然会在一定程度上导致行为性救济的低效乃至无效。为了强化竞争政策在市场经济中的基础地位，提高经营者集中救济的实际效率，要在明确产业政策、政府规制和竞争政策各自功能的前提下，理顺三个反垄断执法部门的权责范围，避免多部门执法对企业微观行为的过度介入。 |
| Abstract | Prevent and prohibit the potentially anticompetitive mergers are the mainly target of antitrust law around the world, structural relief and conduct remedies is the preferred method by the Anti-monopoly Law of China. Using a sample of 86 mergers notified (2008-2015) by the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) of the People's Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Bureau, we analyze factors that influence the MOFCOM’s restrictive conditional merger remedy decisions with Probit model and explain the MOFCOM’s preference on behavior remedies with Negative Binomial Regression model. The econometric analysis suggests that the probability of remedy decision increases with market concentration, post-merger market share of the parties, as well as whether the merger is a vertical acquisition; Probability of behavioral remedy only increases with market share of the merger parties, equity share of the acquirer, and whether the merger happens in a network industry. These results are consistent with the comment rules of the China’s anti-monopoly law on operator’s concentration, such as the “unilateral effects” that may create monopoly power and the “coordinated effects” that may induce collusion or discrimination exercise of the merger parties. Our case studies also find the trend of the MOFCOM’s obvious behavioral preference in merger remedy. However, this preference is conflict with China’s industrial regulatory policies and there also exist some obstacles in the implementation of behavior remedy, which will result in the inefficiency of behavior remedy. Additionally, the article proposes three suggestions to improve the efficiency in the implementation of “Rules of Filing of Concentration of Business Operators” and “Rules of Assessment of Concentration of Business Operators”. That is, to improve the transparency of the remedies decision, to balance the relationship between the industrial policies, government regulation and competition law, and to clearly define the responsibilities of three antitrust departments.
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| 文章编号 | WP1325 |
| 登载时间 | 2019-01-16 |
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