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通才vs专才:高管工作经历与企业并购行为
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TitleGeneralist VS Specialist:Lifetime Work Experience of CEOs and Mergers &Acquisitions  
作者许言 李哲 许年行  
AuthorXu Yan, Li Zhe, Xu Nianhang  
作者单位中国人民大学商学院 
OrganizationSchool of Business, Renmin University of China 
作者Emailblessxuyan@163.com;lizhewenbei@163.com;nhxu@ruc.edu.cn 
中文关键词通才指数 专业化技能 并购频率 并购绩效 
Key WordsGeneral Ability Index; Specialized Skills; M&A Frequency; M&A Performance 
内容提要人才是第一生产力,特别是在党中央提出国家中长期人才发展规划纲要之后,如何“识才”、“用才”更成为学术界研究的一个热点课题。本文手工整理2002-2015年共计3730位公司CEO的详细个人简历信息,构建高管“通才指数”,研究CEO通才指数如何影响企业的并购行为及并购绩效。研究发现:(1)相比单纯职业经历的CEO(专才型CEO)而言,复合职业经历的CEO(通才型CEO)更擅长主导并购活动——通才型CEO发起的并购活动更为频繁,该结论在通过Heckman两阶段自选择模型、PSM样本回归、考察CEO变更事件、通才指数的不同构建方法、控制CEO天赋等一系列稳健性检验后依旧成立。(2)通才型CEO所开展的跨行业和跨地域并购更为频繁,且更多地涉及其过去任职过的行业或地域。(3)通才型CEO主导的并购活动可以获得更好的短期市场反应和长期绩效,这主要源自通才型CEO在并购完成后吸纳了更多的金融机构股东、强化了银企关系并聘用了更多具有政治关系的独立董事。进一步研究发现:通才型CEO具有更高的风险承担偏好,促使其敢于发起包括企业并购在内的高风险决策。这些研究结论不仅拓展了高管个人工作经历如何影响公司财务行为的研究,对于企业如何选才、用才,以提高企业并购效率、促进企业发展也具有重要的现实意义。 
AbstractTalent is the first order determinant of economic growth. How to make good use of talents becomes a hot issue in financial research, especially after the CPC put forward the China's Medium- and Long-Term Talent Development Plan. By collecting the detailed information of 3730 CEOs’ personal resumes from 2002 to 2015 manually, the paper examines how general managerial ability, measured by General Ability Index (GAI), influences the behavior and performance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A hereafter). The results show that, first, compared with specialist CEOs, the generalist CEOs are better at conducting M&As. Firstly, generalist CEOs conduct more M&As. The conclusions still hold after a series of robust tests, including Heckman two-stage self-selection model, PSM sample regression, using the event of CEO turnovers, alternative GAI measure, as well as controlling for CEOs’ talent. Second, the generalist CEOs conduct the cross-industry or cross-region M&A more frequently, and most of which are related to the industries or provinces that generalist CEOs ever worked in. Secondly, M&As conducted by generalist CEOs get better short-term market reactions and long-term firm performance. This is mainly due to that the generalist CEOs attract more financial shareholders, strengthen the relationship with banks and recruite more independent directors with political connnections after the M&A. Further study shows that the generalist CEOs possess higher risk-taking preference, which drives them to engage in risky activities including the M&As. These results not only contribute to the literature on how personal working experience of CEOs influence corporate financial policies, but also have important practical implications for firms to select top managers and improve efficiencies of M&As. 
文章编号WP1236 
登载时间2017-11-10 
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