融资融券交易的信息治理效应
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| Title | The Information Governance Effects of Margin-trading and Short-selling
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| 作者 | 李志生 马伟力 李好 林秉旋 |
| Author | Li Zhisheng,Ma Weili,Li Hao and Lin Bingxuan |
| 作者单位 | 中南财经政法大学金融学院；美国罗德岛大学商学院 |
| Organization | Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; University of Rhode Island |
| 作者Email | sli@znufe.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 融资融券 信息披露 业绩预告 分析师盈利预测 |
| Key Words | Margin-trading and short-selling; Information disclosure; Management forecast; Analyst forecast |
| 内容提要 | 本文基于2009-2014年我国上市公司业绩预告和分析师盈利预测数据，从管理层信息披露和分析师预测的角度研究融资融券交易的信息治理效应。通过比较融资融券标的股票和非标的股票，以及股票加入融资融券标的前后管理层业绩预告和分析师盈利预测的相关特征，本文发现融资融券交易同时具有内部信息治理和外部信息治理的作用。首先，融资融券交易制度推出后，上市公司业绩预告误差显著降低，业绩预告及时性和积极性显著提高，公司对坏消息的公开程度显著提高；其次，融资融券交易的推出有效降低了分析师关于标的公司盈利预测的误差和分歧；此外，内部信息治理发挥了更为基础的中介作用，融资融券交易对分析师盈利预测的影响是通过提高管理层信息披露质量来实现的。 |
| Abstract | This paper investigates the information governance effects of margin-trading and short-selling (MTSS) from the perspective of management earning forecast quality and analyst forecast accuracy using the data of the Chinese stock market from 2009 to 2014. We find that the MTSS have both internal and external information governance effects. Firstly, we show that the introduction of the MTSS significantly improves the quality of management disclosure in terms of accuracy, timeliness and initiative of management earning forecast. Secondly, the introduction of the MTSS significantly decreases the error and dispersion analyst forecast. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the internal governance effect plays a relatively more fundamental intermediary role, and the MTSS affects the analyst forecast accuracy through the improvement of the management disclosure quality. |
| 文章编号 | WP1230 |
| 登载时间 | 2017-10-20 |
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