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高管股权激励与大股东掏空抑制——对大股东和经理人合谋关系稳定性的探讨
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TitleExecutive Stock Incentive and Major Shareholder Tunneling——Study on the stability of collusion between shareholder and man  
作者刘井建 纪丹宁 付杰  
AuthorLiu Jingjian, Ji Danning and Fu Jie  
作者单位大连理工大学管理与经济学部金融与会计研究所 
OrganizationDalian University of Technology, Faculty of Management and Economics 
作者Emailliujingjian@dlut.edu.cn,danning007@dlut.mail.edu.cn,armfujie@foxmail.com 
中文关键词股权激励 高管持股 大股东掏空 合谋关系 
Key WordsEquity Incentive; Executive Stockholding; Major Shareholder Tunneling; Collusion Relationship 
内容提要本文在引入合谋薪酬的委托代理模型中,探究高管股权激励对合谋关系的稳定性以及大股东掏空程度的影响,通过数值模拟与规范分析,从收入效应、风险效应以及身份转换效应三个层面阐释高管股权激励对大股东掏空的作用机理,并进一步揭示大股东异质性特征和不同制度情境中的效应差异。实证结果表明:高管股权激励在一定程度上能够抑制大股东掏空;在大股东异质特征表现更强掏空动机和制度情境更利于掏空行为的公司中,高管股权激励的抑制效应更为显著,成为有助于投资者保护的内部治理机制;准自然实验的PSM-DID方法的识别策略也支持了因果关系,并且2年期的影响效应更为显著。研究证明了高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用,以及大股东和经理人合谋关系的不稳定性,并且通过掏空动机和制度情境中的差异也进一步说明大股东掏空是广泛存在的,研究结论为从公司内外部治理机制层面抑制大股东掏空提供了政策启示。 
AbstractBy introducing collusion compensation into the agency model, this paper explores the effects of executive equity incentive to the stability of collusion relationship and tunneling from major shareholder. Through numerical simulation and normative analysis, we elucidate the mechanism of executive equity incentive on tunneling from three aspects, namely income effect, risk effect and position transformation effect, and to further reveal the moderating mechanism by the major shareholder heterogeneity characteristics and different system environment. The empirical results show that: executive equity incentive can restrain tunneling, and the effect becomes more remarkable in companies that shareholder heterogeneity characteristics show stronger tunneling motivation and their system environment is more apt for tunneling, which contribute to internal governance mechanism for protecting investors; by use of quasinatural experiment, PSM-DID identity strategy test supports our hypotheses, and show that two-year effect is more significant. Our study demonstrates that executive equity incentive can restrain tunneling and these exists instable relationship between major shareholders and managers, which enlighten to restrain tunneling through both internal and external governance mechanism. 
文章编号WP1202 
登载时间2017-06-30 
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