业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗？
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| Title | Does EVA Promote Innovation of Central Government-Owned Enterprises(CGOEs)?
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| 作者 | 余明桂 钟慧洁 范蕊 |
| Author | Yu Minggui,Zhong Huijie and Fan Rui |
| 作者单位 | 武汉大学经济与管理学院 |
| Organization | Economics and Management School of Wuhan University |
| 作者Email | mingyu@whu.edu.cn；2013101050082@whu.edu.cn；fanrui1990124@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 企业创新 业绩考核 激励机制 代理问题 |
| Key Words | Reform of SOE; Privatization; Incentive mechanism；Corporate innovation |
| 内容提要 | 关于国有企业是否需要进行私有化改革的问题存在两种对立的观点。一种观点认为只有私有化才能彻底解决国企效率问题，另一种观点则认为私有化不仅不能解决国企现存问题，还可能导致严重的国有资产流失。本文以2009年国资委修订的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》为切入点，研究这项不涉及私有化的央企高管业绩考核制度对企业创新的作用及经济后果。本文以此次修订为自然实验，采用双重差分法进行检验，发现相对于不受该项制度影响的民营企业来说，央企的创新水平在新政策实施后显著提高。而且，此次修订的考核办法可以显著提高创新对企业价值的边际贡献。上述检验结果意味着，国有企业即使不进行私有化的产权改革，仅仅通过改变高管的激励机制，就可以提高企业效率。因此，私有化很可能并不是解决国有企业效率问题的唯一途径。本文在理论上有助于澄清关于国企私有化改革的争议，同时，有助于拓展和深化企业激励机制和企业创新的相关文献。 |
| Abstract | There are two different views about whether state-owned enterprises (SOE) need privatization reform. One view is that only privatization can thoroughly solve SOE efficiency problem. Another view is that privatization not only cannot solve the existing problems in SOE, but also may lead serious loss of state assets. Based on the revision of Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge at Central Government-Owned Enterprises in 2009, this study analyses the impact of the new EVA performance evaluation on corporate innovation. If this EVA performance evaluation which does not involve property changes of SOE can promote corporate innovation and performance, we can prove that privatization is not the key to improve efficiency of SOE. Using difference-in-differences method (DID), we find a significant increase of CGOEs innovation after EVA evaluation putting into force. Then we use a rich set of tests to show that the baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality. We further examine how EVA evaluation affects the CGOEs efficiency and indicate that the increase of innovation after this policy can further improve CGOEs operating performance. Consequently, we prove that privatization is not the only way to solve SOE efficiency problem. This study can clarify the controversy of privatization of SOE, meanwhile expands and enriches recent literature about incentive mechanism and corporate innovation. Our paper can also provide a theoretical basis and policy reference to further promote and deepen the reform of SOEs in China. |
| 文章编号 | WP1102 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-08-23 |
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