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不完全信息下公共租赁住房匹配机制——基于偏好表达策略的实验研究
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TitlePublic House Allocation Mechanisms with Incomplete Information——An Experimental Study Based on Preference Revelation Stra  
作者邓红平 罗俊  
AuthorDeng Hongping and Luo Jun  
作者单位华中师范大学经济与工商管理学院;浙江财经大学经济与国际贸易学院 
OrganizationSchool of Economics and Business Administration, Central China Normal University;;School of Economics and International Trade, Zhejiang 
作者Emaildenghp@mail.ccnu.edu.cn; 
中文关键词公共租赁住房匹配机制 IIRSD机制 G-S 机制 无嫉妒公平分配指数 
Key WordsMatching Mechanism for Public Rental Housing; IIRSD Mechanism; G-S Mechanism; Fair Distribution of Envy Free Index 
内容提要在价格机制不能充分发挥作用的社会资源分配中,G-S机制被匹配理论证明具有稳定配置资源的性能,IIRSD机制则是目前国内实际采用的公共租赁住房匹配机制。本文在实验室模拟我国公租房匹配情景,于不完全信息环境中运用随机摇号产生的序列作为轮候人的优先权顺序,考察轮候人在G-S与IIRSD两种匹配机制下的偏好表达策略。同时分析了匹配中的策略行为与个人理性及风险偏好的关系;计算并检验由此带来的个人效用与整体福利变化;构建并引入无嫉妒公平分配指数来测度匹配结果的公平程度,从而直接比较了两种机制在公平、效率与无策略性等方面的效果。文章还通过改变被试设计、变换匹配小组人数、计算机模拟所有可能的优先权顺序检验了结果的稳健性。这些实验结果均表明,G-S机制不仅能促使被试真实地表达自己的偏好,且是比IIRSD机制更公平、更有效率的设计。 
AbstractG-S mechanism was proved to be matched with a stable performance in resource allocation when the price mechanism cannot fully play its role in society to allocate resources. However, IIRSD mechanism was currently used to match with the public rental housing in China. In this paper, we simulated real matching with public rental housing in laboratory and used Yaohao random sequence to generate the order of priority as people waiting with the incomplete information environment, in order to investigate people strategy in expressing their preferences under the both G-S and IIRSD matching mechanisms. We also analyzed the relationship between the strategic behavior in expressing their preferences and individual rational behavior or risk preferences; computed and tested personal utility and changes in overall welfare; built and introduced a fair distribution of envy free index to measure the fairness of matching consequences, which directly compared the effect of both mechanisms in fair, efficient and non-strategic aspects. This study also been tested the robustness of experimental results by changing the design, the number of group matches and simulating all the possible order of priority. These experimental results show that G-S mechanism can promote not only the subjects to express their true preferences, and also is more fair and efficient design than IIRSD mechanism. 
文章编号WP1044 
登载时间2016-03-29 
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