信息披露视角下P2P网络借贷的泡沫经济分析
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Bubble Economy of online P2P Lending: Information Disclosure and Extrusion Policy
|
| 作者 | 周正龙 马本江 胡凤英 |
| Author | Zhou Zhenglong, Ma Benjiang and Hu Fengying |
| 作者单位 | 中南大学商学院；桂林电子科技大学 |
| Organization | School of Business, Central South University;School of Business, Guilin University of Electronic Technology |
| 作者Email | mabenjiang@csu.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 互联网金融 信息披露 庞氏骗局 进化稳定策略 P2P网络借贷泡沫 |
| Key Words | I-finance; Information Disclosure; Ponzi Scheme; Evolutionary Stable Strategy; P2P Lending Bubble |
| 内容提要 | 中国P2P网络借贷不仅存在着风险评估体系不健全等一系列问题，在运行的过程中也呈现出泡沫经济迹象和网络市场虚拟运行等影响市场失灵的经济问题。为此，论文通过数据信息和庞氏骗局模式披露中国P2P网络借贷可能存在的泡沫迹象，并用噪音交易与有限套利模型分析中国P2P网络借贷市场可能存在的虚拟运行机制，随后借助进化稳定策略对P2P借贷泡沫情况进行演化分析和仿真检验。结果表明， P2P网络借贷引发泡沫经济的根本原因是投资利率与借款利率之间非均衡性，所以有必要从政策的角度出发修正市场行为，并将泡沫挤出市场。进一步地，通过对称博弈和非对称博弈的对比分析得到，对称博弈的进化稳定策略与初始策略的选择概率无关，而非对称博弈的进化稳定策略与初始策略的选择概率有关。 |
| Abstract | Online P2P lending has produced an important impact on the traditional financial. However, there are some problems, which may show the sign of a bubble economy. Therefore, for the research purpose, this paper analyzes the possible sign of bubble situation on China’s growing P2P lending through data information and Ponzi scheme mode. In proceeding with our research, this paper makes a break-through analysis by using the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The results have shown that, bubble economy of online P2P lending is attributable to the unbalance between interest rate for borrowing and for lending. Thus it is necessary to fix the market behavior from the perspective of policy. Further, through the contrastive analysis of the symmetry game and asymmetric game, the evolutionary stable strategy of symmetric game has nothing to do with the selection probability of initial strategy, and the evolutionary stable strategy of asymmetric game is related to the selection probability of initial strategy. |
| 文章编号 | WP1041 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-03-22 |
|