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中央政府换届与企业风险承担:是经济政策不确定性效应,还是锦标赛激励的影响?
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TitleThe Central Government Rotation and Corporate Risk Taking: is the Effect of Economic Policy Uncertainty, or the Results of  
作者刘志远 王存峰  
AuthorZhi-yuan Liu and Cunfeng Wang  
作者单位南开大学商学院 
OrganizationBusiness School of Nankai University 
作者Emailwangcf@mail.nankai.edu.cn 
中文关键词政治经济周期 中央政府换届 企业风险承担 政策不确定性 政治晋升激励 
Key WordsPolitical Business Cycle; Central Government Rotation; Corporate Risk Taking; Policy Uncertainty; Political Promotion Incentives 
内容提要中央政府换届一方面增大了经济政策不确定性,另一方面又会诱发政治晋升和政治关联锦标赛,使企业的风险承担意愿受到影响。本文以1995-2014年A股上市公司为样本,利用面板数据模型,对此展开研究。研究发现,中央政府换届整体上抑制了企业风险承担,但该效应主要集中于国有企业、低市场化地区和治理水平差的企业;而对于治理良好的民营企业,中央政府换届则提升了其风险承担。进一步研究发现,抑制效应主要出现在换届之前,而提升作用则开始于换届期间。上述结果表明,政策不确定性在此期间发挥主导作用。本文的研究一方面有助于解答中央政府换届如何产生经济后果问题,另一方面深化了对政策不确定性的理解,即政策不确定性中的机遇因素具有积极意义。 
AbstractThe central government rotation (CGR) on the one hand, increases the economic policy uncertainty (EPU), on the other hand will induce the tournaments for pursuing the political promotion or the political connections. As a result, the corporate risk taking (CRT) will be affected. Based on a seasonal sample of China’s A-share listed non-financial companies from 1995 to 2014, this paper investigates these effects by use of the panel data models. Results indicate that the CGR is inhibiting the CRT in China, but this effect mainly exists in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), low marketization regions and low governance enterprises. However, for the non-SOEs with well governance, the CGR instead promotes the CRT. Further study finds that the inhibitions primarily exist before the CGR, but the promotions mainly appear during the CGR. All of these results mean that the policy uncertainty plays a major role in the effect of the CGR. Because the CRT of a place will determine the region's economic growth, this paper will improve our understanding about the problem of political systems how to affect the economic development in China. 
文章编号WP957 
登载时间2015-11-13 
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