政府投资、官员任期与债务违约
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Government Investment, Appointment Duration and Debt Default
|
| 作者 | 高飞 李连发 |
| Author | Gao Fei and Li Lianfa |
| 作者单位 | 北京大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Peking University |
| 作者Email | lfli@pku.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 政府投资；债务违约；官员任期 |
| Key Words | Government investment, Debt default, Appointment duration |
| 内容提要 | 本文构建了政府投资模型用于研究地方政府的借债行为，并分析了官员不同任期长度下地方政府的举债行为，从理论上证明了时间不一致性的存在。在地方政府官员调动过于频繁的情况下，淡化GDP考核虽然有助于降低地方政府负债规模，但作用有限，难以有效控制其过度举债的倾向。而在地方政府官员任期时间跨度比较长的情况下，淡化GDP考核则可以有效控制政府债务的过度扩张。本文还运用了主权债务违约模型，结合国际案例对我国中央政府的偿债能力进行了分析，认为我国中央政府防范债务风险的关键是完善不合理的制度体系和避免经济下行的风险。 |
| Abstract | Based on a government investment model, this paper analyzes the local government’s borrowing behavior under different appointment duration terms, proving the existence of time inconsistency. With shorter duration for appointment terms, excessive borrowing of local government is hard to contain; with longer duration for appointment terms, excessive borrowing of local government is controlled effectively. Then, this paper proposes the sovereign debt default model and analyzes the solvency of China’s central government. Although the debt ratio of Chinese government is not high, we should realize the hazard of the excessive growth of debt and economic stagnation. |
| 文章编号 | WP913 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-08-14 |
|