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社会责任与股价崩盘——“价值利器”或“自利工具”?
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TitleCorporate Social Responsibility and Stock Crash Risk——Self-Interest Tool or Value Strategy?  
作者权小锋 吴世农 尹洪英  
AuthorQuan Xiaofeng,Wu Shinong and Yin Hongyin  
作者单位苏州大学东吴商学院会计系;厦门大学管理学院 
OrganizationSuzhou University;Xiamen University 
作者Emailqxf@suda.edu.cn;snwu@xmu.edu.cn; 
中文关键词企业社会责任;股价崩盘风险;工具假说;价值假说 
Key WordsCorporate Social Responsibility; Stock Price Crash Risk; Self-Interest Tool Hypothesis; Value Strategy Hypothesis 
内容提要企业在推行社会责任的背后,究竟是为了股东利益或管理层利益?是管理层的“自利工具”或股东的“价值利器”?这个问题成为近年来财务学和管理学交叉研究的热点问题。本文结合中国股票市场的环境和制度背景,从非对称风险这一独特视角,系统地分析与揭示了企业社会责任影响股价崩盘风险的客观表现、传导路径与治理因素。研究发现:(1)企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正向关系,表明中国上市公司推行社会责任的同时加剧了股价的崩盘风险,可见存在“社会责任的崩盘效应”。(2)依据信息披露形式分组,发现企业社会责任的崩盘效应仅在强制披露组存在,而在自愿披露组并不存在;依据是否接受第三方鉴证分组,发现企业社会责任的崩盘效应仅在未鉴证组存在,而在鉴证组并不存在。(3)通过路径检验发现,企业社会责任的崩盘效应存在完全的投资路径、部分的信息路径,但不存在会计路径和税收路径。表明自利的管理层利用社会责任建设恶化信息环境并进行非效率的投资导致崩盘效应的产生。(4)企业内部控制质量与外部机构投资者监督并不能对企业社会责任的崩盘效应形成有效的制约和治理作用。表明我国上市公司内控制度和机构投资者尚不能发挥“市场监督”和“市场稳定”的作用。总之,本文研究发现并验证了我国上市公司推行企业社会责任体现了“工具特征”而非“创值特征”的推论。 
AbstractBehind the implementation of corporate social responsibility, whether it is in the interests of the interests of shareholders or management? The management of “self-serving tool “or shareholders “value strategy”? This issue has become a hot research issue in the inter-discipline of finance and management field. This paper analyses the way corporate social responsibility affects the stock price crash risk from a unique perspective of asymmetric risk. We conclude our study with four arguments that come as follows. Firstly, corporate social responsibility has a significant positive relationship with the risk of stock price crash risk. It shows that there is a significant crash effect of corporate social responsibility in Chinese capital market. Secondly, in the aspect of disclosure form, we find out that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility only exists in the mandatory disclosure group, not in the voluntary disclosure group. In the aspect of whether to accept third-party verification, we find out that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility only exists in no assurance group. Thirdly, we find that the crash effect of corporate social responsibility has complete investment path and partial accounting path, but not the accounting path and tax path through the path verification.therefor, the way of generating crash effect is: mangers abuse social responsibility to construct bad information environment and make non-efficient investment to hide management hoarding behavior. Lastly, internal control and external supervision of institution investors cannot have an effective control on the crash effect of corporate social responsibility, which indicates that the institution of internal control and external supervision have not played the role of “market monitor” and “market stabilizer ”currently in the capital market. In general, we prove that corporate social responsibility reflects the “self-interest tool” rather than “value strategy”. 
文章编号WP911 
登载时间2015-08-14 
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