信心、信号传递与经济刺激政策
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| Title | Confidence, Signaling and Economic Stimulus Policy
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| 作者 | 何平 刘泽豪 |
| Author | He Ping and Liu Zehao |
| 作者单位 | 清华大学经济管理学院 |
| Organization | Tsinghua University |
| 作者Email | heping@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn；liuzh.13@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 信号传递 经济刺激政策 消费者信心 企业家信心 |
| Key Words | Signaling; Economic Stimulus Policy; Entrepreneur Confidence; Consumer Confidence |
| 内容提要 | 经济刺激政策的传导路径因各国经济环境不同而有差异。本文基于信号传递模型提出了一个新的理论分析框架，指出经济刺激政策的财务无效率可以作为政府向市场传递信息的手段。实证结果证明了在中国经济特殊背景下，刺激政策首先影响企业家信心，进而影响企业投资，最终作用于宏观经济，而传统文献中基于真实经济周期和消费平滑的信心模型对政策传导路径的解释不适用于中国。我们的结果表明尽管“四万亿”经济刺激政策带来一些低效率的投资，但经济刺激影响了企业家信心，对GDP的增长有正外部性。 |
| Abstract | The transmission channel of economic stimulus policy varies in different economic environments. This paper points out that the belief models based on real business cycle and smoothing consumption in the literature don’t apply to China. We develop a new framework with information asymmetry, claiming that investment inefficiency can serve as a signaling tool of the government to deliver information to the market. Empirical evidence based on various econometric models illustrates that the 2009 “Four Trillion” stimulus policy, though along with some inefficient investment, has contributed to economic growth through its significant positive impact on entrepreneur confidence. |
| 文章编号 | WP909 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-08-07 |
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