“中国式分权”与全要素生产率：“逐底竞争”还是“趋优竞争”
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| Title | The “Chinese Mode” Fiscal Decentralization and TFP:Race to the Bottom or Race to be Better
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| 作者 | 余泳泽 刘大勇 黄群慧 |
| Author | Yu Yongze,Liu Dayong and Huang Qunhui |
| 作者单位 | 南京财经大学产业发展研究院;天津大学管理与经济学部；中国社会科学院工业经济研究所 |
| Organization | Industry Development Research Institute, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics ,Nanjing 210046,China；Institute of Industrial Economics of Cass, Chinese Academy of Social Science；Tianjin University |
| 作者Email | yongze125@126.com； |
| 中文关键词 | “中国式分权” 全要素生产率 财政分权 “逐底竞争” “趋优竞争” |
| Key Words | “Chinese Mode Decentralization”; Total Factor Productivity; Fiscal Decentralization; Race to the Bottom; Race to Be Better |
| 内容提要 | 本文从“中国式分权”的制度背景与理论出发，在空间经济学视角下分析财政分权制度对区域全要素生产率（TFP）的影响作用：是导致了TFP的“逐底竞争”还是“趋优竞争”。理论模型结论显示，在“中国式分权”的条件下，各地区之间存在生产率“趋优竞争”的可能，但“标尺竞争”的存在使得“中国式分权”结构也可能对生产率产生消极影响。文章的实证结果不仅证实了财政分权对省际TFP的正向作用，更证明了这种作用是在“趋优竞争”下形成的；但同时发现，单一的政治激励加上有偏的经济激励，使得财政分权引起的全要素生产率“趋优竞争”正在弱化。进一步观察TFP的内部构成后得出，财政分权导致了技术进步（TP）与技术效率（TE）呈现了较为明显的“趋优竞争”；而规模效率（SE）则呈现了较为明显“逐底竞争”。其原因在于：在经济增长目标短期化约束下，晋升博弈所导致的基础设施过度投资、政绩工程等会有损经济增长的规模经济效应。 |
| Abstract | With the institutional background and theory of “Chinese Mode” fiscal decentralization, this paper examines whether regional total factor productivity (TFP) is led to race to the bottom or race to be better by fiscal decentralization system from the perspective of spatial economics. The theoretical model shows that the productivity among regions could have "race to be better”, however, “Chinese Mode” fiscal decentralization structure may also have negative impact on region productivity with the role of "scale” competition. Empirical results verify the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on provincial TFP and show that it benefit from the “race to be better”, meanwhile, this TFP “race to be better” effect is weakening because of political incentives and biased economic incentives. Considering TFP internal constitution, fiscal decentralization has forced technological progress (TP) and technical efficiency (TE) has more “race to be better”; and scale efficiency (SE) presents more "race to the bottom". The reason is that the excessive investment on infrastructure led by political tournaments with the short-term economic growth objective is detrimental to scale efficiency. |
| 文章编号 | WP890 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-06-30 |
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