薪酬激励与动态风险控制机制——以山西票号顶身股为例
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| Title | Incentive Pay Plan and Dynamic Risk Control Mechanism——Evidence from Shanxi Piaohao
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| 作者 | 张琥 兰日旭 |
| Author | Zhang Hu and Lan Rixu |
| 作者单位 | 中央财经大学经济学院 |
| Organization | The Central University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | jameshall@163.com；ganlenlan@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 山西票号 顶身股 薪酬激励 内生性风险 风险控制机制 |
| Key Words | Shanxi Piaohao;Shengu;Incentive Pay; Endogenous Risk;Mechanism of Risk Control |
| 内容提要 | 本文通过构建动态博弈模型，分析了山西票号顶身股薪酬激励机制及其所附带的内生性风险，揭示了票号选择的应对机制的缘由和过失。我们发现，顶身股作为激励手段，可以较好的激励代理人提高工作效率。银股与身股持有者双向出资设立的风险保障金，明显起到固化双方的合作关系的作用，但在责权利不对等的条件下，每位代理人所占份额波动幅度很小，这将引致代理人倾向选择高风险业务，变向的将未来收益变现。由此引发的内生性风险，在仅靠声誉机制、依附官员隐含担保为主的非正式制度约束下，若控制不当，将成为票号甚至整个行业崩溃的内生因素。 |
| Abstract | This paper analyzes the incentive pay plan of Shanxi Piaohao（山西票号） in the past and correspondent risks by a dynamic game model. We find that Shengu（身股） used to play an important role to improve agents’ performance. Moreover, Shengu and Yingu makes up provisions of risk, which turned out to fix the bilateral relations of principal and agents. Under such a mechanism, agents tended to pursue high- risk business because his protion in the provision became lower and lower. Based on the informal regulation of reputation and official implicit guarantee without proper risk control system, it would make the company collapse. |
| 文章编号 | WP887 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-06-12 |
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