银行激励、关系型贷款与最优贷款利率
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| Title | Bank Incentive, Relationship Lending and Optimal Loan Interest Rate
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| 作者 | 张一林 樊纲治 |
| Author | Zhang Yilin and Fan Gangzhi |
| 作者单位 | 西南财经大学 |
| Organization | Southwestern University of Finance and Economics; Konkuk University |
| 作者Email | ylzhangswufe@gmail.com；gzfan@swufe.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 中小企业融资 不确定性 利率市场化 包容性金融 |
| Key Words | SMEs Financing; Uncertainty; Interest Rate Liberalization; Inclusive FinanceSMEs Financing; Uncertainty; Interest Rate Liberalization; Inclusive Finance |
| 内容提要 | 银行利用“关系型贷款”这种贷款技术，能够对中小企业进行有效的监督、减少道德风险，但由于中小企业资金状况的不确定性，银行仍然面临债务违约的风险。本文用几何布朗运动刻画企业违约的不确定性，并构建连续时间金融模型分析银行对中小企业的贷款决策，发现：中小企业能否与银行持续、长期地合作，关键在于贷款利率是否和企业利润（即企业偿债能力）的不确定性相匹配。尽管较低的贷款利率有利于节约企业的融资成本，但当贷款利率“过低”进而与企业利润的不确定性不相匹配时，银行将缺乏为企业提供持续性、包容性金融支持的激励，企业反而面临更大的资金链断裂的风险。在信息对称的关系型贷款中，中小企业的长期利润与贷款利率之间呈“倒U型”关系，使企业长期利润最大化的贷款利率是对企业融资成本和银行贷款激励的最优权衡。本文不仅发现了利率市场化促进中小企业可持续发展的微观机制，还能够为中小企业“融资贵”现象提供新的解释。 |
| Abstract | We extend the continuous-finance model to explore the effect of profit uncertainty on bank financing decisions. We find that in a relationship lending under symmetric information, the bank’s risk comes from the uncertainty of the firm’s profit. A proper loan interest rate is key to the long-term cooperation between the firm and the bank. Although the financing cost decreases as the loan interest rate decreases, the firm can obtain a sustainable and inclusive financial support from the bank only if the loan rate matches its profit uncertainty. The optimal loan interest rate that maximizes the long-term profit of the firm should balance the financing cost and bank incentive. This paper provides new insights into the financing problem of small medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as the liberalization of interest rates. |
| 文章编号 | WP876 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-05-19 |
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