分配倾斜、杠杆应对与劳资“双赢”——基于2008年《劳动合同法》的实证检验 阅读全文
下载全文 |
Title | Skewed Distribution, Leverage Responded and Win-win Labor-capital Relation
|
作者 | 刘斌 王雷 |
Author | Liu Bin and Wang Lei |
作者单位 | 庆大学经济与工商管理学院 |
Organization | School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University |
作者Email | drliubin@263.net;wanglei6943@163.com |
中文关键词 | 劳动合同法 分配倾斜 杠杆应对 劳资“双赢” |
Key Words | Contract Labor Law; Skewed Distribution; Leverage Responded; Win-win Labor-capital Relation |
内容提要 | 本文以我国2008年《劳动合同法》的实施为契机,使用2002-2013年沪深A股市场的上市公司数据,实证考察在劳动保护加强导致职工分配比例提高的情况下,企业所采取的杠杆应对措施及其效果。实证结果发现:(1)《劳动合同法》的实施提高了企业收入分配向职工倾斜的水平;(2)《劳动合同法》的实施提高了企业经营负债杠杆和金融杠杆;(3)《劳动合同法》的实施提高了企业的股东回报水平,且这是企业杠杆应对的结果;(4)《劳动合同法》实施后,企业经营负债杠杆和金融杠杆的提高与公司价值呈倒U型关系。上述结果表明我国《劳动合同法》的实施有效地保护了劳动者的合法权益,而企业通过积极的杠杆应对行为也提高了自身的股东回报率,从而实现了劳资“双赢”的和谐局面。但提高上述两类负债杠杆带来的潜在风险也应引起注意。 |
Abstract | This paper examines whether the implementation of labor contract law increased distribution proportion of compensation for China’s A-share listed firms during the year 2002-2013. Based on this understanding, we further inspect those firms’ rational response which is increasing two kinds of leverage, and finally its influence on firms’ return on equity. The results show that the enforcement of labor contract law improves distribution proportion of compensation and two kinds of corporate leverage. We also confirm that the return on equity is increased after the enforcement of labor contract law, which benefit from corporate leverage. Furthermore, the increase of two kinds of leverage and firms’ market value are inverted U-sharped relationship. We suggest that the enforcement of labor contract law protects the workers’ legal interest and improves firms’ return on equity by leverage response, which achieves a win-win labor-capital relation. However, the potential risk from the increase of two kinds leverage requires urgent attention. |
文章编号 | WP831 |
登载时间 | 2015-03-10 |
|