超额的垂直薪酬差异、股权激励与公司绩效
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| Title | Excess Vertical Pay Dispersion，Equity Incentives and Firm Performance
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| 作者 | 赵晓菊 梅春 王甄 |
| Author | Zhao Xiaoju , Mei Chun and Wang Zhen |
| 作者单位 | 上海财经大学金融学院 |
| Organization | School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | xjzhao@mail.shufe.edu.cn；meichunshufe@163.com；wang.zhen@mail.shufe.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 垂直薪酬差异 股权激励 绩效 |
| Key Words | Vertical Pay Dispersion；Equity Incentives；Firm Performance |
| 内容提要 | 本文以锦标赛理论和公平理论为基础，分析了超额的垂直薪酬差异对公司高管行为及公司绩效的影响，并利用我国上市公司的数据实证检验了超额的垂直薪酬差异对公司绩效的影响，同时结合上市公司的产权性质和实施股权激励的状况进行分析。研究结果表明：超额的垂直薪酬差异对国有企业绩效有显著的负向影响，而对非国有企业绩效没有显著的影响；股权激励的实施可减少超额的垂直薪酬差异对国有企业绩效的负向影响以及增大对非国有企业绩效的正向影响。本文拓展了薪酬差异对公司高管行为及公司绩效影响的研究，其研究结论对上市公司管理层和国有企业监管部门具有一定的借鉴意义和参考价值。 |
| Abstract | Based on tournament theory and equity theory, this paper analyses the effect of excess vertical pay dispersion on the executive’s behavior and firm performance, and empirically examines the relationship of excess vertical pay dispersion and firm performance by using the data of china’s listing firms. Empirical research, combining the ownership property and the status of implementation of equity incentives of listing firms, is followed. The result shows that excess vertical pay dispersion has a significant negative effect on the performance of state-owned firms, and has no significant effect on the performance of non-state-owned firms. The implementation of equity incentives can significantly reduce the negative effect of excess vertical pay dispersion on the performance of state-owned firms, and significantly increase the positive effect of excess vertical pay dispersion on the performance of non-state-owned firms. This paper extends the extant literature of relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance, and has a certain significance and reference value to the management of listing firm and state-owned firm’s regulator. |
| 文章编号 | WP830 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-03-04 |
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