中小股东投票权、公司决策与公司治理——来自一项自然试验的证据
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| Title | Minority Shareholder Participation, Corporate Decisions, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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| 作者 | 孔东民 刘莎莎 |
| Author | Kong Dongmin and Liu Shasha |
| 作者单位 | 华中科技大学经济学院；北京大学光华管理学院 |
| Organization | School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology;Guanghua School of Management, Peking University |
| 作者Email | kongdm@hust.edu.cn；sarahliu@pku.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 中小股东 网络投票 自然试验 公司治理 盈余管理 |
| Key Words | Minority Shareholders; Online Voting; Natural Experiment; Corporate Governance; Earnings Management |
| 内容提要 | 利用深交所的中小股东网络投票这一自然试验数据，本文考察中小股东参与公司治理程度的提升是否影响公司的盈余管理决策，并尝试回答以下两个问题：（1）中小股东参与在公司治理中扮演何种角色？（2）对公司而言，中小股东参与扮演了外部监督角色？还是给公司管理层带来压力而扭曲了管理者行为？整体上，我们发现，中小股东参与度高的公司更倾向操纵盈余。为控制潜在的内生性问题，我们使用滞后变量回归、倾向性得分配对法以及不同工具变量（股票分拆、股东账户数和市场状态），并得到一致的研究结果。最后，进一步发现，在其他条件不变的情况下，高异质波动率的公司更有可能通过操纵盈余来迎合中小股东。本文研究结论具有明晰的政策含义，即在赋予中小投资者参与公司治理的权利的同时，必须提升投资者保护，否则反而会引致适得其反的效果。 |
| Abstract | Using a novel online voting dataset in China’s stock market, we test a catering theory by investigate impacts of minority shareholders’ pressures on earnings management. We attempt to answer: 1) what is the role of minority shareholders participation (MSP) in corporate governance? and 2) does MSP serve as an external monitor to managers, or does it put excessive pressure on them? We find that firms with high MSP levels tend to manage earnings more actively. In order to address the potential endogeneity, we use lagged variables approach, propensity score matching and difference-in-difference methods, and three instrumental variables based on share split event, the number of shareholder accounts and market status, through which we find that our results are robust to different methods and alternative measures. Finally, we find that firms with high information asymmetry, voting for important proposals, and more managerial incentives or financial expertise, are more likely to cater to minority shareholders by earnings management. |
| 文章编号 | WP825 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-02-13 |
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