多种所有制经济竞争、策略外部性与政府规制机制 阅读全文
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Title | Mixed Competition, Strategic Externality and Regulation Mechanism
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作者 | 石明明 张小军 阙光辉 |
Author | Shi Mingming, Zhang Xiaojun and Que Guanghui |
作者单位 | 中国人民大学商学院;国家发展和改革委员会价格监督检查与反垄断局;马里兰大学 |
Organization | Renmin University of China; National Development and Reform Commission; University of Maryland |
作者Email | ms@ruc.edu.cn;zhangxiaoj@ndrc.gov.cn; |
中文关键词 | 多种所有制经济竞争 国有企业 策略外部性 规制机制设计 |
Key Words | Mixed Competition; State-owned Enterprise; Strategic Externality; Regulation Mechanism Design |
内容提要 | 深入研究与拓展多种所有制经济的一般性竞争理论,是深刻理解我国三十五年来不同所有制经济改革发展的重要基础。结合我国的基本经济制度,本文构建了涵盖政府、国有企业、民营企业三方参与的多阶段博弈模型,均衡分析和研究结果表明:(1)博弈的“策略外部性”使得多种所有制经济竞争制度与民营经济竞争制度、国有企业独家垄断经营制度呈现明确的区别,策略外部性从根本上扭曲了市场的资源配置方式,经典国有企业最大化社会福利这一“事前”策略将与“事后”的全局最优结果发生偏离;(2)国有企业的社会目标与经济目标之间并不存在必然的冲突关系;(3)最优规制机制既不等价于要求国有企业最大化社会总剩余,也不等价于要求国有企业完全模仿私人企业,而是要结合国有企业与民营企业的效率比较、国有企业的剩余损失和内部化策略外部性带来的收益之间的权衡等因素进行优化设计,同时明确规制机制的内容并承诺其稳定性,对规制自身的有效性及市场平稳发展具有重要意义。 |
Abstract | To in-depth study and develop a general theory of mixed competition is an important foundation for an understanding of China's ownership system reform in last three decades. This paper constructs a two-stage game model including three kinds of agents like government, state-owned enterprise (SOE) and private enterprise. The equilibrium results show:(a)Strategic externality resulted from the game behaviors makes mixed competition system very different from the private enterprise competition system or the monopolistically SOE system. The strategic externality has fundamentally distorted the resource allocation pattern in the market. The ex-strategy for SOE to maximize the social welfare will be unrealizable, which will deviate from the post result of social optimality. (b)There is no necessary conflict relationship between the social and economic goal for state-owned enterprises. (c)The optimal regulatory mechanism is neither equal to the traditional mechanism which requires SOE to maximize social welfare, nor the mechanism to make SOE acting like private counterparts. Its design should consider the enterprise’s cost efficiency and the trade-off between SOE’s surplus and gain from internalizing strategic externality. The social regulator needs to clarify and commit the regulatory mechanism which is very important for the regulation’s effectiveness and market stability. |
文章编号 | WP700 |
登载时间 | 2014-09-16 |
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