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新兴产业发展中的区域竞争与地方政府补贴
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TitleRegional Competition and Local Government Subsidy in the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries  
作者于津平 吴小康  
AuthorYu Jinping and Wu Xiaokang  
作者单位南京大学经济学院 
OrganizationSchool of Economics, Nanjing University 
作者Emailyujp@nju.edu.cn 
中文关键词产业政策 区域竞争 政府补贴 新兴产业 
Key WordsIndustrial Policy, Regional Competition, Government Subsidy, Emerging Industry 
内容提要各级政府对战略性新兴产业发展寄予厚望,但在理论和实践上存在如何界定培育对象和如何把握政策力度等难题。能否解决这些难题直接关系到实施战略性新兴产业政策的必要性。本文通过理论和实证分析,对地方政府产业补贴行为及其经济效应进行了探讨,揭示了地方政府实施产业补贴政策的行为特征。理论研究发现:地方政府对战略性新兴产业的适度扶持对区域利益提升有益,但低估或过度夸大战略性新兴产业的作用会损害区域利益。最优扶持力度随市场需求增加和本地区企业生产成本优势的提高而上升。即使考虑外部经济效应和动态效应,在制定产业扶持政策时仍应充分考虑区域的比较优势基础。然而,利用中国的经验数据进行实证检验却表明,地方政府产业补贴政策存在逆比较优势选择现象, 资本不充裕地区对资本密集型产业的支持偏好反而强于资本充裕地区。研究认为,这种补贴行为是造成重复建设和区域利益下降的原因。 
AbstractLocal governments in China set high expectations of the strategic emerging industries. However, either in theory or in practice, there exist many unsolved challenges concerning the determination of the targets and the intensity of subsidies to those industries. The solvability of such problems determines the necessity of implementing the policies towards the strategic emerging industries. This article analyzes the local government behaviors of industrial subsidies and their accompanying economic effects with a theoretical model. The results indicate that the local governments’ moderate preference for the scale of the emerging industries has a positive effect on the increase in the regional benefits. On the contrary, underestimating or much overstating the role of strategic emerging industries damages the regional benefits. The optimal rate of the subsidy on emerging industry rises with the increased market demands and the decreased production costs. The subsidy policy decisions should take the comparative advantages of the local industry into the consideration, even if the external economic effects and dynamic effects are considered. However, the empirical studies illustrate that the local government subsidies don’t comply with the rule in China. Capital-intensives industries are even more preferred to be subsided in capital-scarce regions. It concludes that the distorted subsidies result in duplicated construction and decrease of regional benefits.  
文章编号WP699 
登载时间2014-09-16 
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