策略互动的基础——基于情感角度的可能解释
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| Title | The Foundation of Strategic Interaction: An Alternative Interpretation with Empathy
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| 作者 | 何浩然 周业安 左聪颖 |
| Author | Haoran He,Ye’an Zhou and Zuocong Ying |
| 作者单位 | 北京师范大学;中国人民大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Beijing Normal University;Renmin University of China |
| 作者Email | rendayean@163.com；15201568693@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 移情 角色转换 信息披露 最后通牒博弈 实验 |
| Key Words | Empathy; Role reversal; Information disclosure; Ultimatum game; Experiment |
| 内容提要 | 策略互动中经常出现的偏离传统博弈论均衡的行为。本文通过在重复开展的两次最后通牒博弈实验中交换或固定决策者的博弈角色，并在开展决策前操控是否披露交换或固定角色的信息，从而研究移情（empathy）及其由信息披露所影响的程度对策略互动中决策的影响。研究结果表明，是否变换角色以及是否披露信息均对决策不产生影响，证明在策略互动中决策者能够自发地进行完全程度的移情。本文的发现为策略互动中经常出现的偏离传统博弈论均衡的行为提出了基于情感角度的可能解释。 |
| Abstract | Observed behavior commonly deviates from the equilibrium of homoeconomicus models. Using two ultimatum games in sequence, we investigate the impacts of empathy and its degree on decisions in sequential strategic interaction through reversing roles of decision-making across the two games and disclosing information about role reversal prior to decision-making in first game. We find that both role reversal and information disclosure do not affect decisions, showing that natural empathy spontaneously appearing in strategic interaction is throughout enough. Our findings suggest an alternative emotion-based interpretation for the behavioral deviation from the equilibrium of homoeconomicus models. |
| 文章编号 | WP687 |
| 登载时间 | 2014-09-04 |
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