道德风险、政府规制与中小高科技企业融资
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| Title | Moral Hazard, Government Regulation and the Financing of High-tech SMEs
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| 作者 | 燕志雄 张敬卫 费方域 |
| Author | Yan Zhixiong, Zhang Jingwei and Fei Fangyu |
| 作者单位 | 暨南大学产业经济研究院;上海交通大学中国金融研究院 |
| Organization | Jinan University,Shanghai Jiao Tong University |
| 作者Email | yzxinshanghai@sina.com |
| 中文关键词 | 风险投资 道德风险 政府规制 监管 共谋 |
| Key Words | Venture Capital; Moral Hazard; Government Regulation; Monitoring; Collusion |
| 内容提要 | 在世界范围内，各国政府越来越多地关注中小高科技企业融资的可获得性，尤其是处于种子期、初创期和早期的。尽管政府风险投资基金是一种普遍采用的支持方式，但是政府基金的组织形式却不尽相同。就出资比例不同，政府主导型基金与风险投资家型基金恰好是政府引导型基金的两个极端形式。一个很自然且很重要的问题是，何种类型风险投资基金的可获得性最高呢？本文认为，当企业家的道德风险问题很严重时，尽管政府主导型基金有政府的廉价资金，但是过高的代理成本会削弱风险投资的可获得性；替代地，尽管风险投资家型基金可以降低代理成本，但是监管成本与风险投资家的高回报率又会增加企业的融资成本。政府引导型基金恰好是两者的折中方案：它既可以利用风险投资家来降低代理成本，又可以令企业家获取到政府的廉价资金。本文证明了，尽管政府引导型基金会遭受共谋与政府资金约束，但是可获得性仍是最高的。考虑到挤出效应，政府资金的最佳比例应该取决于风险投资的可获得性与挤出效应之间的权衡。无疑，本文很好地解释了为什么政府引导型基金是最成功的。 |
| Abstract | Policy makers around the world have become increasingly concerned about the availability of the financing of high-tech SMEs especially in the seed stage, start-up stage and early stage. Despite the government venture capital funds is a widely used way to support high-tech SMEs, the organization forms are not all the same. In terms of the difference of contributive proportion, government-oriented venture capital funds and private venture capital fund are the two extreme forms of government guidance funds. A natural and important question is, which type of venture capital funds can make the financing of high-tech SMEs more available. This paper argues that, when the entrepreneur's moral hazard problem is very serious, the high agency cost would weaken the availability of venture capital despite the cost of government-oriented venture capital funds is cheap. Alternatively, although the private venture capital funds can reduce agency cost, the monitor cost and high return rate of venture capitalists will increase the cost of financing of entrepreneur. Government guiding funds happen to be a compromise of the two: it can not only make use of the venture capitalists reducing agency cost, but also make entrepreneurs get cheap capital from the government. This paper proves that, even considering the collusion problem and government funding constraints, the availability of government guiding fund is still the highest. Considering the crowding out effect, the optimal proportion of government funds should depend on the trade-off between the availability of venture capital and crowding out effect. Undoubtedly, this paper clearly explains why the government guide fund is so successful. |
| 文章编号 | WP686 |
| 登载时间 | 2014-09-04 |
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