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利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行挤兑——基于动态模型的视角
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TitleMarket-oriented Interest Rate, Deposit Insurance System and Banking Runs——based on the Dynamic Model Perspective  
作者田国强 赵禹朴 宫汝恺  
AuthorTian Guoqiang , Zhao Yupu and Gong Rukai  
作者单位上海财经大学经济学院;东华大学 
OrganizationShanghai University of Finance and Economics; he Glorious Sun School of Business and Management of Donghua University 
作者Email gtian@mail.shufe.edu.cn,zhaoyupu@live.cn;gong.rukai@dhu.edu.cn 
中文关键词利率市场化 存款保险制度 银行挤兑 信息传播机制 
Key WordsMarket-oriented Interest Rate; Deposit Insurance System; Bank Runs; Information 
内容提要在推进利率市场化过程中,避免银行挤兑、实现金融制度平稳转型是转型经济体所面临的重要理论和现实问题。本文构建一般化的动态银行挤兑模型,对经典模型进行扩展,将存款保险制度引入动态模型,探讨了在利率市场化过程中有效地引入和实行存款保险制度的边界条件。所得结果表明,对于金融体系较为成熟和完善的经济体而言,银行对信息反馈的效率高,银行挤兑的风险小,引入存款保险制度的效果较好;而对金融系统不健全的经济体来说,市场信息传播不顺畅,银行的治理水平不高,若再一味地引入存款保险制度,可能带来较大的挤兑风险;另外,银行,尤其是新进入的民营银行,对风险的认识往往不足,引入存款保险制度可能导致严重的道德风险。由此得到如下政策启示:在利率市场化过程中,需要进行存款保险方面的治理建设;而在引入存款保险制度时,需要重视的是,改善金融制度环境,包括建立严格的银行风险控制和监管体系;提高银行对风险的认知和处理能力等,作为制度建设的配套条件。 
AbstractAvoiding bank runs and achieving a smooth transition of financial system in the process of promoting market-oriented interest rate are important theoretical and practical issues faced by transitional economies. This paper sets up a more generalized dynamic bank–runs model by introducing deposit insurance system (DIS) into the classical setting to investigate the boundary conditions of carrying out DIS efficiently in the process of market-oriented interest rate. We show that in the economy with more mature and perfect financial system where the bank has greater information feedback efficiency and faces less possibility of bank runs, the introduction of DIS would achieve good results; however, in the economy with imperfect financial system where market information dissemination is not smooth and the governance level of bank is low, bank would face greater risk of runs if DIS is introduced blindly, especially when unexpected shocks arrive. Moreover, the bank, especially the new private banks, may not adequately understand the risk, so DIS might not only fail to reduce bank runs, but lead to serious moral hazard. Based on the analysis, we provide the following policy implications: In the process of promoting market-oriented interest rate, institutional development on deposit insurance is needed; when introducing DIS, it is required to adopt more stringent regulatory regime to control bank risk correspondingly. The key to further financial system reform in China is introducing DIS and raising the capability of recognizing and processing risks of banking on the basis of improving financial institutional environment gradually. 
文章编号WP656 
登载时间2014-08-15 
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