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决策权配置、盈余管理与投资效率
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TitleDecision-making Rights Allocation, Earnings Management and Investment Efficiency  
作者刘慧龙 王成方 吴联生  
AuthorLiu Huilong, Wang Chengfang and Wu Liansheng  
作者单位 Business School, University of International Business and Economics; School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics; Guanghua School of Management, Peking University 
OrganizationBusiness School, University of International Business and Economics; School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics;Guanghua School of Management, Peking University 
作者Emaillhlgsmer@126.com;wangchengfang@ruc.edu.cn;wangchengfang@ruc.edu.cn; 
中文关键词决策权配置 两职合一 盈余管理 投资效率 
Key Words对外经济贸易大学;浙江财经大学会计学院;北京大学光华管理学院 
内容提要本文研究了总经理和董事长两职合一与盈余管理的交互作用对投资效率的影响。研究结果表明,在董事长与总经理两职分离的公司中,盈余管理没有显著影响投资效率;在盈余管理程度较低的公司中,董事长与总经理两职合一也没有显著影响投资效率;相对于两职分离公司来说,两职合一公司的盈余管理更能造成非效率投资;相对于低盈余管理公司来说,高盈余管理公司的两职合一更能降低公司的投资效率;两职合一公司的盈余管理与非效率投资显著正相关;高盈余管理公司的两职合一与非效率投资显著正相关。本文既拓展了已有盈余质量与投资效率之间关系的研究,也深化了决策权配置的经济后果的研究。 
AbstractThis paper examines how interactive effect of CEO duality and earnings management impacts investment efficiency. It shows that earnings management does not significantly affect investment efficiency in CEO separation firms, and that CEO duality also does not significantly affect investment efficiency in lower level earnings management firms. Earnings management causes more inefficient investment to CEO duality firms than CEO separation firms. CEO duality reduces more investment efficiency to high degree earnings management firms than low level earnings management firms. Earnings management is positively associated with inefficient investment in CEO duality firms, and CEO duality is positively associated with inefficient investment in high degree earnings management firms. This paper extends the extant literature of relationship between earnings quality and investment efficiency, and deepens the research about the economic consequences of decision-making rights allocation. 
文章编号WP636 
登载时间2014-07-28 
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