工作论文
当前位置:首页 > 工作论文
影子银行与货币政策传导
阅读全文         下载全文
TitleShadow Banking and Monetary Policy Transition  
作者裘翔 周强龙  
AuthorQiu Xiang and Zhou Qianglong  
作者单位复旦大学经济学院 
OrganizationSchool of Economics, Fudan University 
作者EmailQiuxiang.fudan@gmail.com; 
中文关键词影子银行 动态随机一般均衡 货币政策 
Key WordsShadow Banking; Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium; Monetary Policy 
内容提要近些年来中国影子银行体系的爆发性增长引发了学界、业界及监管层的广泛关注。本文在一个DNK-DSGE框架下引入了包含影子银行的金融中介体系,将影子银行视为商业银行信贷投放体系在高风险领域的延伸,以反映与西方完全不同的中国影子银行体系的特征。本文的研究发现,正向的利率冲击会引发影子银行体系的扩张以及高风险企业的加杠杆行为,同时降低商业银行信贷和低风险企业的杠杆,负向的利率冲击则恰好相反。影子银行体系在对传统商业银行形成有益补充的同时,也在一定程度上削弱了货币政策的有效性。此外,影子银行经营者的风险偏好以及经营者、所有者之间的代理问题会对影子银行利率以及宏观经济变量产生明显的影响。 
AbstractRecently, shadow banking system in China has drawn great attraction from market, academic researchers and supervisors. In this paper, we incorporate a shadow banking sector, which plays an essential role in high risk credit market, in a DNK-DSGE framework. We argue that Chinese shadow banking system is distinctively different from the ones in developed markets, it’s just an extension of conventional commercial banking system. We find that after a positive interest rate shock, shadow banks will expand their credit and high-risk firms, which can only get financed from shadow banks, will leverage. Meanwhile, commercial banking system will be depressed. While after a negative interest rate shock, the opposite is just true. Although shadow banking system plays a complementary role in financial intermediaries sector, it weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. In addition, risk appetite of shadow bankers and agency problem will affect shadow bank interest rate and other macro-variables significantly. 
文章编号WP555 
登载时间2013-11-20 
  • 主管单位:中国社会科学院     主办单位:中国社会科学院经济研究所
  • 经济研究杂志社版权所有 未经允许 不得转载     京ICP备10211437号
  • 本网所登载文章仅代表作者观点 不代表本网观点或意见 常年法律顾问:陆康(重光律师事务所)
  • 国际标准刊号 ISSN 0577-9154      国内统一刊号 CN11-1081/F       国内邮发代号 2-251        国外代号 M16
  • 地址:北京市西城区阜外月坛北小街2号   100836
  • 电话/传真:010-68034153
  • 本刊微信公众号:erj_weixin