半强制分红政策有效吗？
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| Title | Are the Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules Effective?
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| 作者 | 魏志华 李茂良 李常青 |
| Author | Wei Zhihua, Li Maoliang and Li Changqing |
| 作者单位 | 厦门大学 |
| Organization | Xiamen University |
| 作者Email | finjoy@126.com；mao0833@163.com；lichangqing@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 半强制分红政策 股利政策 实施效果 监管悖论 |
| Key Words | Semi-mandatory Dividends Rules; Dividend Policy; Implementation Effects; Regulatory Paradox |
| 内容提要 | 中国证监会在2001、2004、2006以及2008年推出了一系列将上市公司再融资资格与股利分配水平相挂钩的半强制分红政策，对资本市场产生了深远的影响。本文以1990-2011年1925家中国A股上市公司为样本，首次对半强制分红政策的实施效果进行了较为系统的实证检验。研究发现：（1）半强制分红政策及其各个阶段都显著提高了中国资本市场的派现意愿和派现水平，但相比而言，明确了最低分红“门槛”的2006和2008年政策反而比2001和2004年的引导性政策具有更弱的约束效应。（2）半强制分红政策推动了非竞争性行业、高盈利的公司提高了派现水平，但也迫使那些高成长、有再融资需求的上市公司不得不派现以获取再融资资格。（3）半强制分红政策难以约束“铁公鸡”公司进行派现，也没有降低“铁公鸡”公司的占比。（4）2006和2008年政策引发了上市公司股利政策的“合规”效应，偏低的分红“门槛”对上市公司产生了明显的“负向激励”，表现为发放“门槛”股利和“微股利”的公司明显增加。我们认为，中国独特的半强制分红政策总体而言是有效的，但该政策存在一些明显的局限性亦不容忽视。 |
| Abstract | In 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008, the China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulated a series of so called Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules, which require dividend payment as a precondition for seasoned equity offering. Using a sample of 1925 nonfinancial firms from Chinese A-share market during the period of 1990-2011, this paper provides the first comprehensive empirical research on the effects of the Semi-mandatory Dividend Rules. We show that the Rules have significantly influenced the dividend behavior of Chinese listed firms. Specifically, we find that (1) the Rules in general and their various stages significantly enhanced the propensity and magnitude of dividend payments of Chinese listed firms, although the 2006 and 2008 Rules which specified the “threshold dividend” seem to have weaker effects on dividend payments than the 2001 and 2004 guiding Rules. (2) The Rules have promoted firms in non-competitive industries and with high profitability to increase dividend payouts, and also forced those firms with high growth and financing demand to pay dividends. (3) The Rules have neither forced those “stingy” firms to pay dividends, nor reduced the proportion of “stingy” firms. (4) The low level “threshold dividend” set by 2006 and 2008 Rules triggered the “compliance” effect and “negative incentive”, which characterize a significant increase of firms paying “threshold dividend” and “micro dividend”. |
| 文章编号 | WP547 |
| 登载时间 | 2013-10-15 |
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