政企合谋、周期性干预和行政管理体制
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| Title | Collusion, Cyclical Intervention, and Administrative System in China
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| 作者 | 聂辉华 张雨潇 |
| Author | Nie Huihua and Zhang Yuxiao |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学经济学院 |
| Organization | School of Economics, Renmin University of China |
| 作者Email | niehuihua@263.net； |
| 中文关键词 | 中央政府 地方政府 合谋 集权 分权 |
| Key Words | central government; local government; collusion; centralization; decentralization |
| 内容提要 | 本文在一个“中央政府—地方政府—企业”三层博弈模型中，刻画了中央政府允许政企合谋与防范政企合谋的最优契约。我们发现：（1）当经济增长的好处超过社会稳定的成本时，中央政府会允许地方政府和企业合谋，这解释了普遍的政企合谋现象（矿难、环境污染、逃税等）；（2）价格水平、公众偏好、事故发生概率的变化会导致中央政府在防范合谋和允许合谋之间转变，并体现在产量波动上，这解释了中央政府对生产活动的周期性干预；（3）与集权（垂直管理）相比，分权（属地管理）在某些条件下更容易导致均衡合谋，并且合谋的产量更高、利益输送更多，但无谓损失更小；（4）对中央政府来说，分权弱优于集权。本文的研究对于遏制日益严重的生产安全事故和维护社会稳定具有重要的政策含义。 |
| Abstract | This paper provides a “central government—local government—firm” hierarchical model of collusion and analyzes the optimal contracts for the central government. The main arguments are the following: (1) When the benefits of economic growth overweight the costs of social stability caused by “bad” technology, the central government will allow the collusion between the local government and the firm, which leads to coalmine accidents, environmental pollution, and etc.; (2) Price, public preference, and the probability of accidents will affect the central government’s choice between allowing collusion and detecting collusion, which generates cyclical intervention to productive activities; (3) Compared to centralization, under certain conditions decentralization will be more likely to lead to equilibrium collusion with more production, more transfer, and less deadweight loss; (4) For the central government, decentralization weakly dominates centralization. |
| 文章编号 | WP475 |
| 登载时间 | 2013-06-07 |
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