工作论文
当前位置:首页 > 工作论文
我国外资准入壁垒的政策效应研究
阅读全文         下载全文
TitleFDI Administrative Monopoly’s Economic Performance in China  
作者陈林 朱卫平  
AuthorChen Lin and Zhu Weiping  
作者单位暨南大学产业经济研究 
OrganizationInstitute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China 
作者Emailambitionchenfan@163.com 
中文关键词外资准入壁垒 贸易政策 FDI 行政垄断 新贸易理论 
Key WordsFDI Administrative Monopoly; Trade Policy; FDI; Administrative Monopoly; New Trade Theory  
内容提要我国的《指导外商投资方向规定》和《外商投资产业指导目录》等制度对外资企业的FDI行为作出了严格规制。这种针对外资企业的市场准入壁垒制度会产生何种经济绩效,而这时的贸易政策有效性还能得到保证吗?为此,本文基于新贸易理论构建了一个动态博弈模型进行理论研究。研究结果表明:1)设置一定程度的外资准入壁垒,是以社会福利最大化为目标的发展中国家政府的理性选择。2)外资准入壁垒制度可以提升本国的社会总福利和本土企业利润,但却以损害外资企业利润、本国消费者剩余和总消费量为代价,是一项典型的“以邻为壑”的制度;3)外资准入壁垒提升社会总福利,主要通过提高国产品和进口品的价格、增加本土企业利润而实现。4)关税政策的有效性受到外资准入壁垒制度的显著影响——最优关税率与外资准入壁垒的强度显著正相关,政府在运用这两种政策工具时必须进行综合考虑,不能将其视为两项独立的政策。 
AbstractChina’s foreign investment systems conduct strict regulations on the behavior of FDI by multinational corporations, such as " Regulations on Foreign Investment Direction " and " Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment ", In this situation, how do the government guarantee the effectiveness of export tax rebate and tariff policy? And what effects will the administrative monopoly system, which restrict FDI and multinational companies, produce upon the economic performance? To solve these questions, this paper does the theoretical research through building a dynamic model of North-South national trade. The results show that: 1) The export tax rebate can provide effective incentive on exporting, compared with the tariff policy, it is a relatively independent and moderate trade policy ; 2) Since the optimal tariff policy is closely related to administrative monopoly system, the government must take an overall consideration in the use of these two policy instruments, instead of treating them separately; 3) Administrative monopoly can enhance domestic social welfare and local corporate profits, but at the cost of raising the market price and damaging consumer surplus, which is a typical " beggar-thy-neighbor " system. 
文章编号WP431 
登载时间2013-02-07 
  • 主管单位:中国社会科学院     主办单位:中国社会科学院经济研究所
  • 经济研究杂志社版权所有 未经允许 不得转载     京ICP备10211437号
  • 本网所登载文章仅代表作者观点 不代表本网观点或意见 常年法律顾问:陆康(重光律师事务所)
  • 国际标准刊号 ISSN 0577-9154      国内统一刊号 CN11-1081/F       国内邮发代号 2-251        国外代号 M16
  • 地址:北京市西城区阜外月坛北小街2号   100836
  • 电话/传真:010-68034153
  • 本刊微信公众号:erj_weixin