吃喝、腐败与企业订单
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| Title | Eat-Drink, Corruption and Firm’s Purchase Order
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| 作者 | 黄玖立 李坤望 |
| Author | Huang Jiuli and Li Kunwang |
| 作者单位 | 南开大学 |
| Organization | NanKai University |
| 作者Email | jlhuang@nankai.edu.cn; |
| 中文关键词 | 招待费 腐败 订单 转型经济 |
| Key Words | Entertaining Expenditure; Corruption; Purchase Order; Transitional Economy |
| 内容提要 | 在公平竞争机制缺失的转型经济中，贿赂等腐败行为发挥着特殊的资源配置功能，能够为企业带来利益。本文使用2004年世界银行关于中国12400家企业的问卷调查数据考察了腐败行为与企业产品销售渠道之间的关系，其中企业的腐败活动用招待费支出近似刻画。我们发现，招待费被企业用作不正当竞争的手段：人均招待费支出越多，企业获得政府订单和国有企业订单的机会也越多。我们以企业定制生产为反例排除了招待费作为正常关系资本投资的影响，并采用工具变量估计进一步控制了内生性问题。本文研究意味着，加强对政府和国有企业采购权力监督、增加其采购透明度有助于建设公平有序的经营环境。 |
| Abstract | In transitional economy where fair competition lacks, corruption behaviors such as bribery may help resource allocation which does benefit to firms. With the data of World Bank survey with regard to 12400 Chinese firms in 2004, we investigate the relationship between firm’s corruption and its sales behavior, in which corruption activities are represented approximately by entertaining expenditure. We confirm that entertaining expenditure is surely used by firms as means of malfeasant competition because of the fact that the more entertaining expenditure per capita, the more probable it earns the purchase orders from government and the state owned enterprises. We exclude the possibility of conclusion derived from investment in normal relation capital by regressing firm’s customized production on entertaining expenditure as the counter-example, and further control for the problem of endogeneity by instrumental variable estimation. Our study implies that strengthening supervision and transparency over procurement of government and the SOEs can help to build a fair and orderly business environment. |
| 文章编号 | WP389 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-10-19 |
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