金融危机冲击、行业异质性与内部治理机制的有效性 阅读全文
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Title | Financial Crisis, Industrial Heterogeneity and the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance
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作者 | 张艳磊 荣昭 |
Author | Zhang Yanlei and Rong Zhao |
作者单位 | 西南财经大学 |
Organization | Research Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
作者Email | rongzhao1974@yahoo.com.cn |
中文关键词 | 金融危机 行业异质性 内部治理 市场表现 |
Key Words | Financial Crisis; Industrial Heterogeneity; Corporate Governance; Market Performance |
内容提要 | 借助金融危机提供的自然实验,本文研究了我国上市公司内部治理机制对危机期间公司市场表现的影响。金融危机使得投资回报率大幅下降,提高了内部控制人侵占公司资源的动机。本文首先从理论上探讨了不同程度的外部冲击对企业的内部人侵占行为以及公司市场表现的影响,然后借助金融危机冲击在行业间存在的异质性对提出的主要假说进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,第一大股东存在明显的侵占行为,而其他大股东则有制衡作用,且随着冲击程度的增强其作用同步增强;股权和薪金报酬对于董事和管理层的激励作用则较为复杂。该研究不仅为企业内部治理机制的设计提供了新的理论依据,而且为企业未雨绸缪来应对潜在的外部冲击提供了新的思路。 |
Abstract | With the natural experiment provided by the financial crisis, this paper studies how corporate governance of China’s listed firms influence their market performance. Due to the financial crisis, the return on investment dropped significantly, which should have increased the incentive of insiders to appropriate firm resources. This paper first discusses how the external shock influences the extent of the appropriation, thus firms’ market performance. We then test the main hypotheses based on the heterogeneity of shocks across industries during the financial crisis. Our results indicate that the largest shareholder expropriates while other large shareholders act against it. Moreover, the above patterns become stronger when the external shock is more severe. We also find that the effects of top management’s compensation and their shareholding are complicate. This paper not only provides new evidence on the importance of corporate governance, but also sheds light on how firms should do in order to improve their governance. |
文章编号 | WP323 |
登载时间 | 2012-08-06 |
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