首都经济贸易大学金融学院招聘启事
工作论文
当前位置:首页 > 工作论文
公共合作中的社会困境与社会正义——基于计算机仿真的经济学跨学科研究
阅读全文         下载全文
TitleSocial Dilemma and Social Justice in Public Cooperation  
作者叶航  
AuthorHang Ye  
作者单位浙江大学经济学院和浙江大学跨学科社会科学研究中心 
OrganizationZhejiang University 
作者Emailyehang@china.com 
中文关键词公共品博弈 社会困境 二阶社会困境 利他惩罚 社会正义 
Key WordsPublic Goods game; Social dilemma; Second-order social dilemma; Altruistic punishment and Social justice 
内容提要在公共品博弈中,搭便车会导致合作瓦解,这是一个著名的社会困境。大量研究表明,对搭便车行为进行惩罚,是维护公共合作的有效机制。但惩罚是有成本的,它又会诱发二阶搭便车,进而导致惩罚机制瓦解,这种情形被称为二阶社会困境。如何化解这一困境,是该研究领域最具挑战性的问题之一。通过一个多行为主体(Multi-Agent)演化博弈随机过程的计算机仿真可以证明,在不改变其他假设的情况下,只要公共品的回报足够大,惩罚行为就能保持稳定的演化趋势。我们的研究显示,随着公共品回报的不断增加,二阶搭便车对惩罚者的演化优势会不断缩小;当这种优势足够小时,它就可能被演化过程的随机性所抵消。我们的研究表明,以公平和公正为宗旨的社会正义是化解社会困境的必要前提;在人类的公共合作中,正义原则优先于效率原则;而人类天性中的正义感,则是这一社会规范内部化的产物。 
AbstractIn a public goods game, due to the existence of free-riders, the public cooperation faces a collapse. This is called the social dilemma. Researches show that punishing defection is an effective way of resolving this problem. However, punishment is costly, leading to the appearance of second-order free-riders, which, in turn, prevents punishing behavior from evolving. This situation gives rise to the second-order social dilemma. How does costly punishment arise and evolve? This has become a widely discussed issue in evolutionary research. A computer simulation of the public goods game was conducted; we found that if the returns of the public goods are large enough punishers will obtain evolutionary advantage, so that the second-order social dilemma dissipates. Our research shows, the dominance of cooperators against punishers diminishes as the returns increases, when such dominance becomes sufficiently weak, it is very likely to be offset by the randomness in the evolutionary dynamics. It helps us to better understand why the pursuit of fairness and justice has become a common psychological state and behavioral propensity of human being. Therefore, in public cooperation, social justice is the necessary premise and justice principle is prior to efficiency principle. It also shows that the natural selection endowed mankind with the sense of justice.  
文章编号WP293 
登载时间2012-07-03 
  • 主管单位:中国社会科学院     主办单位:中国社会科学院经济研究所
  • 经济研究杂志社版权所有 未经允许 不得转载     京ICP备10211437号
  • 本网所登载文章仅代表作者观点 不代表本网观点或意见 常年法律顾问:陆康(重光律师事务所)
  • 国际标准刊号 ISSN 0577-9154      国内统一刊号 CN11-1081/F       国内邮发代号 2-251        国外代号 M16
  • 地址:北京市西城区阜外月坛北小街2号   100836
  • 电话/传真:010-68034153
  • 本刊微信公众号:erj_weixin