公司避税活动与内部代理成本
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| Title | Corporate Tax Avoidance and Internal Agency Costs
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| 作者 | 叶康涛 刘行 |
| Author | Ye Kangtao and Liu Hang |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学商学院 |
| Organization | School of Business, Renmin University of China |
| 作者Email | kye@ruc.edu.cn，liuhangruc@gmail.com。 |
| 中文关键词 | 避税 代理成本 公司治理 |
| Key Words | Tax Avoidance; Agency Costs; Corporate Governance |
| 内容提要 | 本文考察了公司避税活动对内部委托代理问题的影响。由于避税活动往往加剧公司内外部的信息不对称，扭曲经理人激励契约设计，因此导致内部委托代理问题更为严重。基于我国上市公司1999—2010年的样本，采用联立方程模型估计方法，我们发现，上市公司避税程度越高，则内部代理成本也越高。我们进一步发现独立董事比例越高，则由于避税所导致的内部代理成本较低，这说明独立董事制度可以有效缓解企业避税的负面经济后果。但是，我们并没有发现机构投资者和国际四大审计弱化了避税和内部代理成本的关系。本文的结论有效地补充和拓展了新近有关避税代理观的研究。 |
| Abstract | This study examines the impacts of corporate tax avoidance on internal agency costs. Tax avoidance will increase the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors, distort managerial incentive contracts, thus exacerbates the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during the period of 1999-2010 and simultaneous equation model, we find that corporate tax avoidance is positively related to internal agency costs. We further find that independent directors alleviate the positive relation between tax avoidance and agency costs, whereas institutional investors and international Big-4 auditors do not. This study extends the emerging literature on the agency perspective of tax avoidance. |
| 文章编号 | WP236 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-02-29 |
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