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多级政府下价格水平的财政决定理论:理论分析和实证检验
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TitleFTPL with Multi-tier Government in Fiscal Federalism: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Tests  
作者赵文哲 董丽霞 卢荻  
AuthorZhao Wenzhe, Dong Lixia and Lu Di  
作者单位中央财经大学经济学院;清华大学经济管理学院;伦敦大学亚非学院,中国人民大学经济学院 
OrganizationDepartment of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics; Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management;The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) - University of London, Department of Economics, Renmin University of China 
作者Emailwenzhe07@yahoo.com.cn; 
中文关键词财政联邦主义 政府层级 FTPL 价格水平 
Key WordsFiscal Federalism; Government Tiers; FTPL; Inflation; The Price Level 
内容提要本文研究在中国特色的财政联邦制度下价格水平的财政决定理论在分税制后是否适用。我们构建了一个多级政府的价格水平的财政决定理论模型,并利用面板向量自回归模型进行检验。在理论模型中,地方政府不能通过发行债券实现预算平衡,它的预算是通过转移支付达到事后的平衡。而中央政府通过负债实现跨期预算平衡。本文的结果表明,即使没有货币供给水平的升高,地方政府财政盈余的下降也会导致均衡价格水平的升高,因而政府实际负债余额下降;财政收入的集权和地方政府间的财政竞争都会抬高均衡的价格水平,这是因为它刺激了地方政府的财政搭便车行为。在中国特色的财政联邦制下,地方政府在决定和影响价格水平上发挥了重要作用,这主要源于我国财政分权体制的扭曲。 
AbstractThe paper researches whether FTPL is valid in Chinese-style fiscal federalism after the tax-sharing reform. We address this question theoretically and test it using Panel VAR model. We use a multi-tier government model to construct a FTPL model in fiscal federalism of Chinese style, where the local government can’t make budgetary balance, instead it’s budget constraint is made balance through transfer payments from the central government and loans from commercial banks, while the central government has the right to issue government bonds to finance deficit and realize intertemporal budgetary constraint balance. This paper shows that a decrease of the local government’s surplus could raise the equilibrium price level even without the monetary supply increasing; both the centralization of fiscal revenue and fiscal competition between local governments will increase the price level because it stimulates the fiscal free-riding behaviour of the local government. Therefore, in Chinese-style fiscal federalism, local fiscal authority plays important role in the price level determination, so that fiscal free-riding behaviour of local governments is easy to lead to the price level fluctuant.  
文章编号WP206 
登载时间2012-01-16 
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