高管薪酬激励会导致银行过度冒险吗？——来自中国房地产信贷市场的证据
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| Title | Does Executive Compensation Promote Bankers’ Excessive Risk Taking?------Evidence from Chinese Real Estate Lending Market
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| 作者 | 洪正 申宇 吴玮 |
| Author | Hong Zheng Shen yu and Wu Wei |
| 作者单位 | 西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 |
| Organization | Southwest University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | xchill@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | Bank Executive; Compensation Incentive; Excessive Risk Taking; Real Estate Lending |
| Key Words | 银行高管 薪酬激励 过度冒险 房地产信贷 |
| 内容提要 | 次贷危机后高管薪酬激励对金融机构冒险行为的影响引起人们的普遍关注，本文以我国房地产信贷市场为例，实证检验了银行高管薪酬激励与房地产信贷风险之间的联系。结果表明，总体上银行高管薪酬与房地产信贷风险呈现显著正相关，进一步的研究还发现两者之间存在着倒“U”型关系，即高管薪酬开始增加时银行有较强的冒险动机，房贷增速加快，当超过某一临界值时继续提高薪酬，银行将趋于保守，房贷增速降低。而且不同类型银行间具有明显差异，平均而言，提高高管薪酬使得城市和农村商业银行更容易冒险，而国有和股份制银行则更可能变得谨慎。为防范金融风险特别是抑制当前的房地产泡沫，需要对我国金融高管薪酬制度进行改革并加强薪酬监管。 |
| Abstract | After subprime crisis researchers and policy makers begin to emphasize the influence of financial executive’s compensation on risk taking. In this paper, through empirically testing the relationship between China’s bank executive compensation and real estate lending, we find that real estate lending is positively related with bank executive compensation; furthermore the relationship is inverse “U” shape. When executive compensation begins to increase, bankers take excessive risk by extending more real estate lending, after the threshold, bankers become conservative to reduce the credit. We also show that increased compensation generally promotes risk taking for city and rural banks, while prevents such action for national banks. The results have several implications for financial executive compensation reform and supervision policies in curbing current real estate bubble to avoid financial crisis. |
| 文章编号 | WP140 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-10-25 |
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