官员交流、任期与反腐败
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| Title | The Rotation and Tenures Limits of Chinese Governors:
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| 作者 | 陈刚 李树 |
| Author | Chen Gang and Li Shu |
| 作者单位 | 西南政法大学经济学院和西南政法大学制度经济学研究中心 |
| Organization | Southwest University of Political Science and Law |
| 作者Email | cgcqu@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 官员交流 官员任期 反腐败 |
| Key Words | Rotation; Tenure; Anti-corruption |
| 内容提要 | 中国的官员治理体制是中央政府反腐败战略的重要组成部分，其中，对官员治理体制产生深远影响的是1990年代建立起来的党政领导干部交流（官员交流）制度。但是，目前还尚未有文献考察过中国的官员交流制度是否真的具有显著的反腐败效应。在本文中，我们采用1998-2009年中国的省长、省委书记交流样本，首次系统研究了官员交流及与之伴生的官员任期限制的反腐败效应。结果发现，官员交流显著的降低了流入地的腐败率，而且，官员的横向交流比纵向交流具有更好的反腐败绩效；同时，官员任期与腐败率之间存在U型的曲线关系，即当地的腐败率随着新任官员的任期的延长呈“先下降后上升”的变动趋势。 |
| Abstract | The economic academic papers increasingly stress the governors’ influence in the development of Chinese economic phenomena, and the successful inspiriting to them is considered to be the key of economic transition. It has been extensively investigated that the inspiriting of local governors can promote economic growth , however, their impact of anti-corruption is ignored. This paper investigates the impact of the rotation and tenures limits of Chinese governors on anti-corruption based on the rotation of local governors from 1998 to 2009. We find that the rotation of local governors significantly decreases corruption in destinations, and the rotation between provinces is more effective than between central and provincial institutions, meanwhile, the relationship of the tenures of local governors and corruption is a U-shaped relation. Our findings are robust, even the criterion of the rotational governors and tenures changed. |
| 文章编号 | WP107 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-08-19 |
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