理性是共同知识吗？ ——交互理性与动态信息交流
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| Title | Can Rationality Be Common Knowledge?Mutual Rationality and Dynamic Communication
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| 作者 | 欧阳葵 王国成 |
| Author | Ou Yangkui and Wang Guocheng |
| 作者单位 | 中国社会科学院研究生院数量经济与技术经济系；中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所 |
| Organization | Chinese Academy of Social Sciences |
| 作者Email | wcsoyk@163.com；gcwang@cass.org.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 主观信念 交互理性 共同知识 信息交流 纳什均衡 |
| Key Words | Subjective belief; mutual rationality; common knowledge; communication; Nash equilibrium |
| 内容提要 | “共同知识”是博弈论与经济分析的核心概念，在国内文献中的严格形式化表述却十分罕见。充分地理解这一概念不但对于理解经济分析以及博弈求解（例如纳什均衡）的基本逻辑是必要的，也有助于澄清关于理性假设的一些不恰当的批评。本文试图严格地给出知识模型的形式化综述，并试图为“理性是共同知识”这一假设提供一个合理的解释。进一步，文中探讨了信息交流的动态过程，并表明在直接信息交流下，所有参与人的所有知识都是共同知识；并且，直接信息交流结果必然导致纳什均衡。 |
| Abstract | Common knowledge is a central concept in game theory and economic analysis. However, it has seldom been formalized in Chinese literature. A complete understanding about common knowledge is not only necessary for understanding the basic logic of economic analysis and game solutions, such as Nash equilibrium, but also helpful for clarifying some inappropriate critiques about the hypothesis of rationality. This paper attempts to provide a formal survey on modeling knowledge and also to propose a rational explanation of the usual assumption, i.e., rationality is common knowledge. Furthermore, the dynamic process of communication has also been explored and it shows that any knowledge of anyone is common knowledge under direct communication and Nash equilibrium is natural for this result. |
| 文章编号 | WP57 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-01-25 |
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