地方官员的土地引资
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| Title | Investment-driven land supply
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| 作者 | 张莉 王贤彬 徐现祥 |
| Author | Zhang Li Wang Xianbin and Xu Xianxiang |
| 作者单位 | 中山大学岭南学院 |
| Organization | Lingnan college, Sun Yat-Sen University |
| 作者Email | Lnsxuxx@mail.sysu.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 地方官员；土地财政；土地引资；增长的政治经济学 |
| Key Words | political Elite; land finance; land supply; political economic growth |
| 内容提要 | 地方政府热衷于出让土地，现有文献强调土地财政，但地方官员还面临政治激励，为增长而竞争，有土地引资的动机。本文从理论和实证两个方面考察地方官员的土地引资行为。在理论上，推导出地方政府土地引资时的出让土地的决定方程，在实证上，采用2003-2008年间城市面板数据，发现土地引资具有显著的解释能力，具体而言，工业用地的土地引资动机最强、住宅用地的次之、商业办公用地的最小；还发现地方政府的土地供应曲线是向后折弯的。这些发现意味着，在为增长而竞争的经济体里，高价出让土地并不是地方政府追逐的唯一目标，土地引资也是考察地方政府土地出让行为的有益视角。 |
| Abstract | Chinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before，and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually， local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simultaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that， in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy， local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; we then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese city panel data. This finding means that China's land issues links with factors outside the land market， and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China's land problems. |
| 文章编号 | WP53 |
| 登载时间 | 2011-01-25 |
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