政府竞争、土地财政与基础设施供给：理论与证据
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Intergovernmental Competition、Land Finance and the Making of China’s Excellent Infrastructures
|
| 作者 | 汤玉刚 赵大平 何念如 |
| Author | Tang Yugang, Zhao Daping and He Nianru |
| 作者单位 | 山东大学经济学院 上海立信会计学院 中国人民银行上海总部 |
| Organization | Shandong University, Shanghai lixin Universiy of Commerce, PBC |
| 作者Email | tangyugang@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 基础设施 土地财政 捆绑BOT |
| Key Words | Infrastructure Investment; Land Finance; Binding BOT |
| 内容提要 | 本文讨论了分税制后我国基础设施投资规模高速增长的经济逻辑：不是分税制所提供的稳定性政府间收入分成合约刺激了基础设施投资，而是分税制后的纵向财政压力迫使地方政府灵活而隐蔽地利用了正在发育中的土地要素市场，使基础设施的供给能力超常扩张。土地财政模式和捆绑BOT模式说明了超常供给能力的形成机制。中国式分权下的地方政府竞争所创造的超常基础设施需求与上述超常的基础设施供给能力相结合，揭示了分税制后基础设施投资高速增长的事实。初步的实证检验支持这一理论假说。对基础设施建设模式的研究映射了20世纪90年代中期之后中国经济增长模式的内核。 |
| Abstract | This paper offers an economic logic of the making of China’s excellent infrastructures after tax sharing system reform. Tax sharing contract is not the major factor to stimulate infrastructure investment. Subsequent vertical fiscal pressure induced local public finance innovation based on the maturing land market, which extended the infrastructure supply capacity significantly. Land finance model and binding BOT model describe the mechanism of supply capacity formation. Super infrastructure demand created by government competition meets super supply capacity. Preliminary empirical test supports the above hypothesis. The mode of infrastructure development reflects the essence of China’s economic growth model after the mid 1990s. |
| 文章编号 | WP32 |
| 登载时间 | 2010-12-23 |
|