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人们关注的是分配动机还是分配结果?
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TitleInequality Aversion or Reciprocity?  
作者陈叶烽 周业安 宋紫峰  
AuthorChen Yefeng Zhou Yean and Song Zifeng  
作者单位浙江大学经济学院; 中国人民大学经济学院; 国务院发展研究中心 
OrganizationSchool of Economics,Zhejiang University; School of Economics,Renmin University of China; Development Research Center of the State Council 
作者Emaillenggone@gmail.com; rendayean@163.com; szifeng-pk@163.com 
中文关键词差异厌恶偏好 互惠偏好 最后通牒实验 
Key WordsInequality Aversion; Reciprocity; Ultimatum Game 
内容提要本文通过设计一组最后通牒实验考察了分配动机的公平和分配结果的公平对人的行为决策的影响,并分别从浙江和北京两地获取了相关实验数据。通过一个角色随机分配的简化最后通牒实验中提议者可供选择分配方案向响应者发送的动机是否公平的信号,我们发现响应者对于不同可供选择分配方案下的同一个分配的拒绝率显著不同,这说明基于动机的互惠偏好确实在人的行为决策中扮演重要角色。同时我们通过一组修正型的最后通牒实验从分配结果公平的角度考察了其影响机制,我们发现分别在保证博弈实验中38%和免惩罚博弈中89%的被试拒绝行为不能被差异厌恶偏好理论进行解释。本文实验的结果在于说明分配动机的公平比分配结果的公平更会影响人们的决策行为,其暗含的政策含义即分配过程的公平比分配结果的公平更为重要。 
AbstractThis paper sheds light on how to test social preferences behind the responders’ rejection in the ultimatum game when the proposers offer a positive allocation. Employing a set of ultimatum game experiments and gathering the experimental data from Zhejiang and Beijing respectively, we make a investgation about the impact of intention-based reciprocity preferences and outcomes-based inequality aversion to human behavior’s decision. Through a mini ultimatum game in which the responder can signal different information about the intentions of the proposer, we found that the identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. The result shows that the reciprocity preferences play an important role in people’s decision. Meanwhile we investigate the mechanism of the inequality aversion through a set of modified ultimatum games. We found that there are 38% and 89% responders’ behavior in guarantor game and impunity game respectively can not be explained by the inequality aversion theory. The result shows that people prefer the intention of allocation more than the outcomes of allocation, which also means that the fairness of allocation process is more than the fairness of allocation outcomes. 
文章编号WP17 
登载时间2010-11-22 
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