转移支付、公共品供给与政府规模的膨胀
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| Title | Intergovernmental Transfer, Provision of Public Goods and the Expansion of Government’s Size
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| 作者 | 范子英 张军 |
| Author | Fan Ziying, Zhang Jun |
| 作者单位 | 华中科技大学经济学院 复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心 |
| Organization | School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology; China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University |
| 作者Email | ivannj@163.com |
| 中文关键词 | 转移支付 公共品供给 政府规模 要素市场改革 |
| Key Words | Intergovernmental Transfer; Public Goods; Government’s Size; Factor Market Reform |
| 内容提要 | 在财政分权的框架下，地方政府为了资本的流入而相互竞争，增加在基础设施方面的投入，而忽视公共品的投资。本文利用Tiebout机制建立的理论模型表明，在要素流动受限的情况下，带有配套条款的专项转移支付成为中央政府解决公共品供给不足的首要选择，该转移支付通过分摊地方政府投资公共品的成本，激励地方政府提高本地公共品的供给水平，但间接使得地方政府的规模出现膨胀。随后利用1995-2004年的省级面板数据证实了上述假说，并且还发现专项转移支付不仅会使得地方政府支出水平上升，同时还会增加地方政府的人员规模，为未来“吃饭财政”的困境埋下隐患。 |
| Abstract | Local governments increase investment on infrastructure to compete for the capital inflows, and neglect the provision of public goods, under the framework of fiscal decentralization. We establish a theoretical model using the Tiebout mechanism, the model shows that matching grants/transfer is the best option for the central government to solve under-provision of public goods when the factor mobility is limited in the case, the transfer can encourage local governments to increase local public goods by sharing the investment costs between central and local governments, but the transfer would indirectly make the size of local government expand. We use a provincial panel data from 1995-2004 to testify the above hypothesis, not only the spending of local governments increased with the matching grants, but also the number of bureaucrats increased, which aggravates the future financial burden. |
| 文章编号 | WP13 |
| 登载时间 | 2010-10-19 |
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